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DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND
RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MATTERS*
ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS** AND JANE C. GINSBURG***
INTRODUCTION
The proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is currently drafted to
cover most fields of private litigation, including intellectual property.'
However, as those following the Hague process are aware, the Con-
vention has run into considerable difficulties. There is currently rea-
son to be concerned that it may not be promulgated at all, or that if it
is promulgated, that it will be reduced in scope and cover only select
areas of litigation, likely not to include intellectual property. This
proposal is meant to spur the intellectual property bar to consider
whether it would be desirable to create a regime for international
enforcement of intellectual property law judgments in the event that
efforts at the Hague do not come to fruition in a manner that covers
disputes in this area. A second question is whether, even if proceed-
ings at the Hague do go forward, an instrument aimed exclusively at
intellectual property matters would have advantages over a conven-
tion of more general scope. Such a convention could be adopted un-
* Thanks to Graeme Austin, Joachim Bonell, Ruth Day, Francois Dessemontet, Graeme
Dinwoodie, Jonathan Franklin, Catherine Kessedjian, Andreas Lowenfeld, and Linda
Silberman, and to the commentators at the Chicago-Kent College of Law Symposium on
"Constructing International Intellectual Property Law: The Role of National Courts," October
18-19, 2001. This work was supported by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg
Research Fund of New York University School of Law, and by a summer research grant from
Columbia Law School.
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Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Judgments in Transnational Intellectual Property Matters
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der the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") or through the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
There are several reasons to believe that an instrument drafted
specifically for intellectual property disputes would be particularly
advantageous. First, as it stands, the proposed Hague Convention is
mainly aimed at facilitating the enforcement of judgments; it includes
features that would also make the adjudication of multinational dis-
putes more efficient, but that is not its primary goal. Yet, for intellec-
tual property disputes, efficiency should be a principal target.
Modern distribution methods, particularly satellite and Internet
transmissions, make it increasing likely that intellectual property
rights will be exploited simultaneously in more than one territory.
The ability to consolidate claims arising from these usages in one
court, with the expectation that the judgment of that court will be
recognized in all convention States, could reduce costs for all sides,
conserve judicial resources on an international basis, and promote
consistent outcomes.
Second, a convention drafted for intellectual property disputes
can take account of issues uniquely raised by the intangibility of the
rights in issue. For example, where a general convention's jurisdic-
tion provisions speak generally of "acts," "omissions," and their fore-
seeability, an instrument on intellectual property disputes can be
geared specifically to the events that comprise infringement. Where a
general convention may be concerned with curtailing forum shopping
by potential plaintiffs, an intellectual property agreement can also
consider the ability of a potential defendant to gain litigation advan-
tages through the choice of the location of the activities that give rise
to infringement. In certain situations, the propriety of expanding ju-
risdiction depends on the possibility of inconsistent outcomes; a con-
vention tailored to intellectual property can specify what that term
means in the context of public goods.
An instrument for intellectual property litigation can also deal
specifically with matters of unique concern to the creative commu-
nity. The strong link between culture on the one hand, and intellec-
tual production and utilization on the other, means that the
territoriality of these rights is of crucial importance: individual na-
tions must be able to retain some control over the local conditions
under which these products are created, exploited, and accessed. At
the same time, an approach that creates new avenues for cross-
cultural enrichment needs to be considered. While it would be
[Vol. 77:1065
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difficult to develop choice of law rules in the context of a general
convention, it is possible to consider them here, where inherent terri-
torial limits are well established in domestic legislation, case law, and
longstanding international instruments. Similarly, the circumstances
where trans-border injunctions are permissible can be specified to
include consideration of cultural, health, and safety issues. Other
issues of prime interest to the information industries can also be con-
sidered. For example; provisions on contract disputes can be tailored
to deal with mass-market contracts, which are becoming prevalent in
certain intellectual property transactions; provisions on infringement
can be made sensitive to the interests of the "new media," such as
Internet Service Providers.
Most important, the convention can be confined to rights cov-
ered by the intellectual property part of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("TRIPs Agreement") and open to signature only
to countries that have joined the WTO and fully implemented the
TRIPs Agreement.2 Since these are countries that have agreed to
enforce intellectual property law and are subject to dispute resolution
proceedings if they fail to do so, these limitations would reduce con-
cerns, sometimes expressed in connection with the draft Hague Con-
vention, that forum shopping will undermine the delicate balance that
each nation has struck between the rights of intellectual property us-
ers and owners. And although dispute resolution under the WTO
cannot provide litigants with a substitute for a centralized and
authoritative appellate body (such as the US Supreme Court or the
European Court of Justice), it can provide assurance of transparent
and efficient judicial process, along with institutional mechanisms
(such as dispute resolution panels, the Dispute Settlement Board, and
the Council for TRIPs) for examining intellectual property law as it
develops through consolidated adjudication of multinational disputes.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This proposal is adapted from the October 30, 1999 text of the
Hague Conference Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 3 Like the proposed
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement].
3. The 1999 version of the Hague Convention is not the most recent draft. However, it is
the version under consideration at the time this project began and remains the only completed
20021 1067
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Hague Convention, the right to enforce a judgment in member States
depends on whether the court issuing the judgment enjoyed an ap-
proved basis of jurisdiction over the litigants. However, alterations
have been made to better tailor the convention to intangible rights
and to the needs of the creative community, including both producers
and users of intellectual products. The principal areas where changes
have been made are as follows:
1. Scope. The Convention would be open only to TRIPs
implementers and, with three additions and one exception, it would
cover the same rights covered by the TRIPs Agreement.
The first addition is sound recordings. Although the combina-
tion of the Berne Convention4 and the TRIPs Agreement cover the
rights of composers and performers with respect to the making of
sound recordings and the rights of producers as to the reproduction of
sound recordings, communication to the public is not covered. At the
same time, however, there appears to be international consensus that
communication of the sound recordings (performance rights) should
be protected against at least some kinds of unauthorized communica-
tion to the public (WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty).5
Because these instruments adopt principles akin to those found in the
TRIPs Agreement, and because enforcing rights under these instru-
ments raises problems similar to those arising in litigation involving
TRIPs Agreement rights, communication rights are included in this
Convention.
The second and third additions are disputes over domain names
and rights specified in the Paris Convention.6 These are not yet
clearly fully protected by TRIPs. Again, because the principles of
protection and the problems of enforcement are so similar to the
rights clearly covered by the TRIPs Agreement, they are included in
the scope of this Convention.
The exception is patent litigation, where the expertise required
for accurate decision making, coupled with the low incidence of si-
rendition of a judgments convention. Accordingly, it forms the basis of this project. Where
ideas were taken from later revisions, they are expressly noted.
4. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971 (amended 1979), S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
5. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-
17, 36 I.L.M. 76.
6. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967 (amended 1979), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
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multaneous multinational infringements, makes the benefits of the
Convention unlikely to outweigh the costs. Although this draft dem-
onstrates [in brackets] how patent litigation could be treated to
minimize costs, it takes the position, elaborated upon in the commen-
tary, that patent disputes should remain outside the Convention,
leaving international concepts concerning consolidation of worldwide
disputes and enforcement of foreign judgments to develop on their
own.
2. Jurisdiction. Unlike the Brussels Convention,7 which attempts
to use personal jurisdiction as a way to identify one forum as the sin-
gle most appropriate location for the resolution of a particular dis-
pute, and unlike the Hague Convention, which uses personal
jurisdiction to create a narrow range of appropriate choices, this Con-
vention identifies a set of fora with adjudicatory authority over the
parties. In part, this is a consequence of the commitment to consoli-
dation and cooperation. The parties' choices need not be narrowed if
all courts seized with parallel litigation will, ultimately, consult with
one another and with the parties to find the best place to adjudicate
the entire dispute. Conversely, the courts and parties can select a
better forum (in terms of convenience for the parties and witnesses,
expertise of the decision maker, and relationship to the dispute) if
there are several courts that enjoy adjudicatory authority. In part,
this decision also emanates from the view that forum shopping in in-
tellectual property disputes cannot, in any event, be controlled
through personal jurisdiction rules: intangible rights and infringe-
ments can be reified in too many locations to make personal jurisdic-
tion an effective limit on potential fora.
Like the proposed Hague Convention, this is a "mixed" conven-
tion. It describes bases of jurisdiction that are predicates to enforce-
ment in all member States and it describes bases of jurisdiction that
7. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969)
(text as amended by the Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on Its
Interpretation by the Court of Justice, reprinted at 18 I.L.M. 21 (1979)) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]; see also Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989)
[hereinafter Lugano Convention]. The Brussels Convention is currently being revised. See
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 28, 2001 O.J. (L 012) 1, 9
[hereinafter Revised Brussels]. Unless otherwise noted, references are to the current version of
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions.
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are prohibited in cases involving foreign habitual residents of member
States. It leaves member States free to decide for themselves the
conditions under which judgments predicated on other bases of juris-
diction are enforceable.
3. Contract disputes. Because arbitration is now a common way
to resolve intellectual property disputes, this proposal makes mem-
bership in the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention")
a precondition.8
Mass-market contracts (sometimes called "shrinkwrap" or "click
through" agreements) are also becoming increasingly common in
intellectual property transactions. The enforceability of these agree-
ments has been quite controversial and the Convention takes the po-
sition that the inability to negotiate does raise special concerns.
Accordingly, the enforceability of any contract provision affecting the
place of dispute resolution is subject to a requirement of negotiation
or, in nonnegotiated contracts, reasonableness in the choice of forum.
Factors taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the cho-
sen forum include whether, in the absence of a forum-selection
clause, the chosen forum would have had jurisdiction over the non-
drafting party.
4. Infringement actions. This instrument adapts jurisdictional
doctrines regarding tort actions to tailor them to the context of intel-
lectual property infringement and to the issues raised by the distribu-
tion of works in a digital environment. In addition, this proposal
deals with "new media" defendants, such as Internet Service Provid-
ers. US law does not require special procedural protection for media
defendants because substantive law has many explicit safeguards on
the use of litigation to chill expression. In the absence of such safe-
guards in the domestic laws of every member State, it was thought
necessary to create procedural protections in the form of immunity
from suit in locations where contacts are purely passive.
5. Consolidation. A central insight animating this proposal is
that efficient adjudication of intellectual property disputes is a
benefit-to the parties, to the nations whose judicial resources would
otherwise be redundantly utilized, and to the development of sound
intellectual property law. Both US and European laws have mecha-
8. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
[Vol. 77:1065
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nisms to promote consolidation, and the techniques of both systems
are invoked here.
a) The multiple-defendant and third-party provisions of the 1999
draft of the Hague Convention are utilized to expand the number of
courts with adjudicatory power over all the defendants. These provi-
sions have, however, been altered to make them compatible with the
US conception of due process.
b) The lis pendens provision of the 1999 draft of the Hague Con-
vention has been utilized to consolidate before a court first seized
with a coercive action, all transactionally related claims arising from a
single territory's intellectual property rights.
c) For cases where parallel litigation is ongoing in several terri-
tories, the consolidation provision of the Brussels Convention has
been adapted to encourage all of the courts seized with parts of a
multinational dispute to cooperate with one another and with the
parties to choose a forum for centralized dispute resolution.
d) Consolidation is further promoted by giving each court uni-
lateral power under a US-style forum non conveniens doctrine to sus-
pend proceedings in favor of a more appropriate forum. At the same
time, this doctrine is limited to prevent courts from dismissing causes
of action simply because they are based on foreign law.
e) The proposal allows parties to promote complete resolution
of their disputes by permitting them to assert supplemental claims,
such as transactionally related counterclaims, including counterclaims
for declarations of rights. The proposal could go further and use US-
style res judicata law to require the parties to assert transactionally
related claims (under penalty of claim and issue preclusion), but does
not do so out of deference to the less aggressive nature of res judicata
law in other parts of the world.
6. Remedies. This proposal makes clear that the monetary and
injunctive awards rendered by courts with proper authority over the
parties must be recognized by all member States. But there are ex-
ceptions. Compensatory relief must always be recognized, even if
based on statutory amounts rather than proof of actual damages.
However, exemplary and punitive awards are recognized only to the
extent recognized by the enforcing jurisdiction. Both permanent and
preliminary injunctions must generally be recognized. Moreover,
courts may decline to enforce injunctions where its territory's health,
safety, or fundamental cultural policies are at stake, but normally
only if damages would afford effective relief in that territory. Courts
20021
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other than the one where the action is pending are also able to order
enforceable preliminary injunctive relief, but such relief must be lim-
ited to the territory of the court and to its territorial rights.
7. Choice of law. One reason that segments of the intellectual
property bar have been opposed to the draft Hague Convention is
that they fear that the territorial nature of intellectual property law
will be lost. Because this notion is mainly based on the risk that a
court will apply the wrong law to a dispute (this is most often ex-
pressed as the court will apply forum law to foreign activities), con-
sideration was given to incorporating choice of law rules into the
Convention, and to making enforcement turn on both an appropriate
basis of personal jurisdiction and an application of appropriate law.
The problem with this approach is that it could lead, in essence, to
relitigation of every case in the enforcing court. Nonetheless, because
the use of inappropriate law is a special danger in intellectual prop-
erty litigation, consideration is being given to adding a new ground
for nonrecognition to those listed in the draft Hague Convention.
This provision would permit a court where recognition is sought to
deny enforcement when the rendering court's choice of law was arbi-
trary or unreasonable. Indicia of arbitrariness and unreasonableness
would be worked out in commentary.
The text of the proposed Convention is immediately below. It is
followed by draft comments. The intent of this project is to demon-
strate that it is feasible to draft an international agreement on en-
forcing intellectual property judgments; should such a proposal go
forward, its provisions would be subject to negotiation and revision.
Many issues require further elaboration. The remedies sections await
further consideration of choice of law issues. Specifics about choice
of law also need to be considered in light of the Rome Convention on
Contracts and an eventual Rome Convention on Torts.9 Should a
Hague Judgments Convention that excluded intellectual property be
adopted, work on the interaction between the two instruments would
be necessary. Work is also needed on the relationship between this
Convention and the American Law Institute International Jurisdic-
tion and Judgments Project1o and on how litigation in nonmember
States will be treated.
9. See generally Kurt Siehr, Revolution and Evolution in Conflicts Law, 60 LA. L. REV.
1353 (2000).
10. Draft documents on this project are available through the American Law Institute's
website, at http://www.ali.org/.
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Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in
Intellectual Property Matters
Preliminary matters: coverage
* This is a draft Convention on jurisdiction and recognition of
judgments.
* Countries eligible to join the Convention are WTO members
whose obligations under the TRIPs Agreement have come due. The
Convention might itself be an appendix to TRIPs.
* Because arbitration is likely to become increasingly important
in intellectual property matters, signatories to this Convention must
also be members of the United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereafter the New
York Convention).
* Subject matter covered: registered and nonregistered intellec-
tual property rights, including: [patent,] copyright and neighboring
rights, trademark, and other intellectual property rights covered by
TRIPs and its successor agreements, as well as rights of communica-
tion to the public right in sound recordings [and unfair competition
claims].
Initial Comment on Coverage
This is a proposed Convention on jurisdiction and recognition of
judgments in intellectual property cases. The digital networked envi-
ronment is increasingly making multiterritorial simultaneous commu-
nication of works of authorship, trade symbols, and other intellectual
property, a common phenomenon. The likelihood of multiterritorial
infringements increases accordingly. In this environment, the practi-
cal importance of adjudicating a multiterritorial claim in a single fo-
rum should be readily apparent. Indeed, without consolidation of
claims and recognition of judgments, effective enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights, and by the same token, effective defenses to
those claims, may be illusory for all but the most wealthy litigants.
The following text is based in part on the work of the Hague
Conference Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, particularly its Oct. 30, 1999 text,
and on the work of the American Law Institute International Juris-
diction and Judgments Project. Although these proposed instruments
20021
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include general provisions regarding adjudication of tort and contract
claims, and although unauthorized use of intellectual property comes
within their scope (as either the tort of infringement or as breach of a
contract), intellectual property litigation presents special problems.
For example, localizing torts involving intangible rights can be diffi-
cult, especially when the activity involves digital works transmitted
through the Internet; mass-market licenses may pose problems differ-
ent from those encountered in consumer contracts generally. Moreo-
ver, some of the rules proposed in these other instruments,
particularly those regarding consolidation of claims, and multiple de-
fendants, are not always well-tailored to intellectual property dis-
putes. This Convention deals with these special problems by building
on the work of both the Hague Conference and the ALI.
CHAPTER-SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article 1 Substantive Scope
1. The Convention applies to copyright, neighboring rights, [pat-
ents,] trademarks, other intellectual property rights, and rights against
unfair competition, as covered by the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property, and its successor Agreements. In
addition, this Convention applies to rights over communication to the
public of Sound Recordings and to claims involving domain names.
2. A dispute is not excluded from the scope of the Convention
by the mere fact that a government, a governmental agency or any
other person acting for the State is a party thereto.
3. Nothing in this Convention affects the privileges and immuni-
ties of sovereign States or of entities of sovereign States, or of inter-
national organizations.
4. This Convention does not apply to:
a. Cases in which intellectual property claims are an inciden-
tal matter, and
b. Enforcement of arbitral awards that are subject to the
New York Convention.
Article 2 Territorial Scope
1. A State is eligible to become a Contracting State if it is a
member of the World Trade Organization, and has become obligated
to fully implement the TRIPs Agreement, and is also a member of the
New York Convention.
[Vol. 77:1065
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2. The provisions of Chapter II shall apply in the courts of a
Contracting State unless all the parties are habitually resident in that
State. However, even if all the parties are habitually resident in that
State-
a. Article 4 shall apply if they have agreed that a court or
courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction to determine the
dispute;
b. [Article 8, regarding exclusive jurisdiction over declara-
tory judgment actions concerning patent validity, shall apply;]
c. Articles 12 and 14 shall apply where the court is required
to determine whether to decline jurisdiction or suspend its proceed-
ings on the grounds that the dispute ought to be determined in the
courts of another Contracting State.
3. The provisions of Chapter III apply to the recognition and en-
forcement in a Contracting State of a judgment rendered in another
Contracting State.
CHAPTER H-JURISDICTION
Article 3 Defendant's Forum
1. Subject to the provisions of the Convention, a defendant may
be sued in the courts of the State where that defendant is habitually
resident.
2. For the purposes of the Convention, an entity or person other
than a natural person shall be considered to be habitually resident in
the State -
a. where it has its statutory seat,
b. under whose law it was incorporated or formed,
c. where it has its central administration, or
d. where it has its principal place of business.
Article 4 Agreements Pertaining to Choice of Court
1. If the parties have agreed that a court or courts of a Con-
tracting State shall have jurisdiction to settle any dispute which has
arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship,
that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction, and its jurisdiction
shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Where an
agreement having exclusive effect designates a court or courts of a
non-Contracting State, the courts in Contracting States shall decline
jurisdiction or suspend proceedings unless the court or courts chosen
have themselves declined jurisdiction.
2002]
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2. An agreement within the meaning of paragraph 1 shall be
valid as to form, if it was entered into or confirmed -
a. in writing;
b. by any other means of communication which renders in-
formation accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference;
c. in accordance with practices established between the par-
ties;
d. in accordance with a usage of which the parties were or
ought to have been aware and which is regularly observed by parties
to contracts of the same nature in the particular trade or commerce
concerned.
3. In nonnegotiated contracts, an agreement within the meaning
of paragraph 1 shall be valid if the designated Contracting State or
forum is reasonable in light of-
a. the location of the non-contract-drafting party,
b. the availability of online dispute resolution or other forms
of virtual representation,
c. the resources of the parties; in particular, of the non-
contract-drafting party,
d. the sophistication of the parties; in particular, of the non-
contract-drafting party,
e. the substantiality of the connection between the desig-
nated forum, and the parties or the substance of the dispute, including
whether the designated forum would have had jurisdiction over the
non-drafting party in the absence of a forum-selection clause
f. for registered rights, whether the designated forum was es-
tablished by the State to foster expertise in adjudicating disputes of
this type.
g. whether the terms of the agreement were sufficiently ap-
parent with respect to accessibility, typographic readability, and na-
tional language so as not to cause surprise.
Article 5 Appearance by the Defendant
1. [Subject to Article 8,] a court has jurisdiction if the defendant
proceeds on the merits without contesting jurisdiction.
2. The defendant has the right to contest jurisdiction no later
than at the time of the first defense on the merits.
3. If defendant does not appear, the court may enter judgment.
However, if local rules so permit, it must satisfy itself that the plain-
tiff's assertions of the bases of jurisdiction are well-founded.
[Vol. 77:1065
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Article 6 Infringement Actions
1. A plaintiff may bring an infringement action in the courts of-
a. any State where defendant substantially acted (including
preparatory acts) in furtherance of the alleged infringement, or
b. any State to which the alleged infringement was intention-
ally directed, including those States for which defendant took no rea-
sonable steps to avoid acting in or directing activity to that State, or
c. any State in which the alleged infringement foreseeably
occurred unless the defendant took reasonable steps to avoid acting
in or directing activity to that State.
2. If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the ba-
sis of the intentional direction of the alleged infringement to that
State, then those courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the
injury arising out of unauthorized use occurring in that State, unless
the injured person has his habitual residence or principal place of
business in that State.
3. If an action is brought in the courts of a State only on the ba-
sis of the occurrence of the infringement in that State, then those
courts shall have jurisdiction only in respect of the injury arising out
of unauthorized use occurring in that State.
4. Notwithstanding arts. 6.1(b) and (c), and 6.2, an Internet
service provider shall not be subject to jurisdiction on the basis of
claims arising out of activity occurring outside the forum State, if the
activity is solely related to the provider's transmitting, routing, or
providing connections for material through a system or network con-
trolled or operated by or for the service provider, or if the activity
solely concerns the intermediate and transient storage of that mate-
rial in the course of such transmitting, routing, or providing connec-
tions, if:
a. The transmission of the material was initiated by or at the
direction of a person other than the access provider;
b. The transmission routing, provision of connections, or
storage is carried out through an automatic technical process without
selection of the material by the service provider;
c. The service provider does not select the recipients of the
material except as an automatic response to the request of another
person;
d. No copy of the material made by the service provider in
the course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on
the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone
2002]
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other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained on
the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such an-
ticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably necessary
for he transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and
e. The material is transmitted through the system or network
without modification of its content.
Article 7 Agreements Pertaining to Intellectual Property Rights
1. An action to enforce an agreement pertaining to intellectual
property may be brought in any country whose rights are covered by
the agreement.
2. In nonnegotiated contracts, the court should also consider the
factors listed in Article 4.3.
Article 8 Declaratory Judgments
1. Actions for a declaration of rights may be brought on the
same terms as an action seeking substantive relief.
2. [However, in proceedings which have as their object the ob-
taining of a declaration of the invalidity or nullity of a registration of
patents, the courts of the Contracting State in which the deposit or
registration has been applied for, has taken place, or, under the terms
of an international convention, is deemed to have taken place, have
exclusive jurisdiction. The issue of invalidity of a patent granted un-
der the laws of another country may be adjudicated in an infringe-
ment action brought pursuant to the rules of this Convention.]
Article 9 Counterclaims and Supplemental Claims
1. A court that has jurisdiction to determine a claim under the
provisions of the Convention also has jurisdiction to determine all
claims between the parties arising out of the transaction or series of
transactions or occurrence on which the original claim is based, irre-
spective of the territorial source of the rights at issue, and irrespective
of which party asserts them.
2. A court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a supple-
mental claim unrelated to intellectual property rights if it substan-
tially predominates over the claims properly within the scope of the
Convention.
Article 10 Multiple Defendants
1. A plaintiff bringing an action against a defendant in a court of
the State in which that defendant is habitually resident may also pro-
ceed in that court against other defendants not habitually resident in
that State if-
[Vol. 77:1065
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a. the claims against the defendant habitually resident in that
State and the other defendants are so closely connected that they
should be adjudicated together to avoid a risk of inconsistent judg-
ments, and
b. as to each defendant not habitually resident in that State,
there is a substantial connection between that State's intellectual
property rights and the dispute involving that defendant, or
c. as between the States in which the other defendants are
habitually resident, and the forum, the forum is the most closely re-
lated to the entire dispute, and there is no other forum in which the
entire dispute could be adjudicated.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to a codefendant invoking an ex-
clusive choice of court clause agreed with the plaintiff and conform-
ing with Article 4.
Article 11 Third Party Claims
1. A court that has jurisdiction to determine a claim under the
provisions of the Convention shall also have jurisdiction to determine
a claim by a defendant against a third party for indemnity or contri-
bution in respect of the claim against that defendant to the extent that
such an action is permitted by national law, provided that there is a
substantial connection between that State's intellectual property
rights and the dispute involving that third party.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to a third party invoking an exclu-
sive choice of court clause agreed with the defendant and conforming
with Article 4.
Article 12 Lis Pendens
1. Subject to Article 13 and provided that the court second
seized does not have exclusive jurisdiction under Article 4, when the
same parties are engaged in proceedings in courts of different Con-
tracting States, the court second seized shall suspend the proceedings
if the court first seized has jurisdiction and is expected to render a
judgment capable of being recognized under the Convention in the
State of the court second seized, irrespective of the relief sought,
when:
a. the claims arise from a single territory's intellectual prop-
erty rights, or
b. the claims arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions or occurrence.
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if the court second seized has ex-
clusive jurisdiction under Article 4.
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3. The court second seized shall decline jurisdiction as soon as it
is presented with a judgment rendered by the court first seized that
complies with the requirements for recognition or enforcement under
the Convention.
4. Upon application of a party, the court second seized may pro-
ceed with the case if the plaintiff in the court first seized has failed to
take the necessary steps to bring the proceedings to a decision on the
merits or if that court has not rendered such a decision within a rea-
sonable time.
5. If in the action before the court first seized, the plaintiff seeks
a determination that it has no obligation to the defendant, and if an
action seeking substantive relief is brought in the court second seized
a. the provisions of paragraphs 1-4 above shall not apply to
the court second seized, unless the declaratory judgment plaintiff has
advanced its claim as part of an action initiated before the court first
seized by the declaratory judgment defendant, and
b. the court first seized shall suspend the proceedings at the
request of a party if the court second seized is expected to render a
decision capable of being recognized under the Convention.
6. The provisions of the preceding paragraphs apply to the court
second seized even in a case where the jurisdiction of that court is
based on the national law of that State in accordance with Article 15.
7. For the purpose of this Article, a court shall be deemed to be
seized -
a. at the time when the document instituting the proceedings
or an equivalent document is lodged with the court, provided that the
plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required
to take to have service effected on the defendant, or
b. if the document has to be served before being lodged with
the court, at the time when it is received by the authority responsible
for service, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to
take the steps he was required to take to have the document lodged
with the court.
Article 13 Consolidation of Territorial Claims
1. Upon the motion of a party, or sua sponte, the court first
seized should consider the advantages of worldwide resolution of the
dispute among the parties through consolidation of related pending
actions, and through inviting the parties to assert all intellectual prop-
erty claims related to the action in a single forum.
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2. For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be re-
lated where, irrespective of the territorial source of the rights and the
relief sought, the claims arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions or occurrence.
3. In deciding whether and how to consolidate the action, the
court should consult with the parties and with other courts in which
related actions are pending, and together they should consider:
a. in general, whether consolidating would promote effi-
ciency and conserve judicial resources and the resources of the par-
ties, including whether the difficulty of managing the litigation
outweighs the benefits of consolidation;
b. whether or not inconsistent judgments could result if mul-
tiple courts adjudicated the related claims.
4. The issue of consolidation must be raised no later than at the
time of the first defense on the merits.
5. If there is no consolidation of related actions, the judgment in
one action shall not be preclusive of the other.
Article 14 Exceptional Circumstances for Declining Jurisdiction
1. In exceptional circumstances, when the jurisdiction of the
court seized is not founded on an exclusive choice of court agreement
valid under Article 4, [or on Article 8] the court may, on application
by a party, suspend its proceedings if in that case a court of another
State has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the
dispute. Such application must be made no later than at the time of
the first defense on the merits.
2. The court shall take into account, in particular-
a. any inconvenience to the parties in view of their habitual
residence;
b. the nature and location of the evidence, including docu-
ments and witnesses, and the procedures for obtaining such evidence;
c. applicable limitation or prescription periods;
d. the possibility of obtaining recognition and enforcement
of any decision on the merits;
e. whether the Contracting State in which the court seized is
located has the most significant relationship to the parties or the
claims;
f. [in patent cases, the expertise of the judicial system of the
Contracting State in which the court seized is located.]
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3. In cases involving consolidation, the court should also con-
sider
a. whether the court first seized has jurisdiction over as many
parties as another court, including courts in which related claims are
pending, unless the economic center of gravity of the case is in the
court first seized;
b. whether the court has, relative to another court, including
courts seized with related causes of action, the subject matter author-
ity to adjudicate all of the territorial rights put into issue, unless the
economic center of gravity of the case is in the court first seized;
c. in disputes over contract rights, whether the court has the
most significant relationship to the contract. In particular, the court
should take into account:
(1) the residence of the parties;
(2) the country in which the intellectual property was
developed;
(3) the country in which the principal obligation under the
contract is to be performed.
4. In deciding whether to suspend the proceedings, a court shall
not discriminate on the basis of the nationality or habitual residence
of the parties.
5. A court shall not dismiss or suspend the proceedings on the
sole ground that the case raises questions of foreign law.
6. If the court decides to suspend its proceedings under para-
graph 1, it may order the defendant to provide security sufficient to
satisfy any decision of the other court on the merits. However, it shall
make such an order if the other court has jurisdiction only under Ar-
ticle 15, unless the defendant establishes that sufficient assets exist in
the State of that other court or in another State where the court's
decision could be enforced.
7. When the court has suspended its proceedings under para-
graph 1,
a. it shall decline to exercise jurisdiction if the court of the
other State exercises jurisdiction, or if the plaintiff does not bring the
proceedings in that State within the time specified by the court, or
b. it shall proceed with the case if the court of the other State
decides not to exercise jurisdiction.
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Article 15 Jurisdiction Based on National Law
Subject to Articles 4, 5, [8,] and 19, the Convention does not pre-
vent the application by Contracting States of rules of jurisdiction un-
der national law, provided that this is not prohibited under Article 16.
Article 16 Prohibited Grounds of Jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the courts of a Con-
tracting State on the basis solely of any of the following:
a. the presence or the seizure in that State of tangible prop-
erty belonging to the defendant, except where the dispute is directly
related to that property;
b. the presence or the seizure in that State of intellectual
property belonging to the defendant, except where the dispute is di-
rectly related to that intellectual property;
c. the nationality of the plaintiff;
d. the nationality of the defendant;
e. the domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence
of the plaintiff in that State;
f. the carrying on of commercial or other activities by the
defendant in that State, except where the dispute is directly related to
those activities;
g. the service of a writ upon the defendant in that State;
h. the temporary residence or presence of the defendant in
that State;
i. the signing in that State of the contract from which the
dispute arises.
Article 17 Authority of the Court Seized
Where the defendant does not enter an appearance, the court
shall verify whether Article 16 prohibits it from exercising jurisdiction
if-
a. national law so requires; or
b. the plaintiff so requests.
Article 18 Verification of Notice
1. The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not estab-
lished that the document which instituted the proceedings or an
equivalent document, including the essential elements of the claim,
was notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way as
to enable the defendant to arrange for a defense, or that all necessary
steps have been taken to that effect, under the law of the State of the
court first seized.
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2. Paragraph 1 shall not affect the use of international instru-
ments concerning the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial
documents in civil or commercial matters, in accordance with the law
of the forum.
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply, in case of urgency, to any provi-
sional or protective measures.
Article 19 Provisional and Protective Measures
1. The court having jurisdiction under the rules of this Conven-
tion to determine the merits of the case has jurisdiction to order any
provisional or protective measures, including trans-border injunc-
tions.
2. The courts of a State in which intellectual or tangible property
is located have jurisdiction to order any provisional or protective
measures in respect of that property.
3. Courts in other Contracting States not having jurisdiction un-
der paragraphs 1 or 2 may order provisional or protective measures,
provided that-
a. their enforcement is limited to the territory of that State;
and
b. their purpose is to protect on an interim basis a claim on
the merits which is pending or to be brought by the requesting party.
CHAPTER I1- RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
Article 20 Definition of "Judgment"
For the purposes of this Chapter, "judgment" means-
a. any decision given by a court, whatever it may be called,
including a decree or order, as well as the determination of costs or
expenses by an officer of the court, provided that it relates to a deci-
sion which may be recognised or enforced under the Convention;
b. decisions ordering provisional or protective measures in
accordance with Article 19, paragraph 1.
Article 21 Verification of Jurisdiction
1. Except in cases where the defendant has waived a challenge
to jurisdiction by joining issue on the merits of the case in accordance
with Article 5.2, the court addressed shall verify the jurisdiction of the
court of origin. In cases where objections to jurisdiction are waived
through appearance, the court addressed shall verify that issue was
joined without contesting jurisdiction.
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2. In verifying the jurisdiction of the court of origin, the findings
of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction shall be pre-
sumed correct. However, this presumption does not apply if the
judgment was given by default.
3. In verifying the jurisdiction of the court of origin when that
court has rendered a default judgment, the court addressed must sat-
isfy itself that the plaintiff's assertions of the bases of jurisdiction un-
der this Convention and under the law of the State of the court of
origin were well-founded.
4. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may not be re-
fused on the ground that the court addressed considers that the court
of origin should have declined jurisdiction in accordance with Article
14.
Article 22 Judgments Excluded from Chapter III
This Chapter shall not apply to judgments based on a ground of
jurisdiction provided for by national law in accordance with Article
15.
Article 23 Judgments to be Recognized or Enforced
1. A judgment that is within a basis of jurisdiction provided for
in this Convention shall be recognized or enforced under this Chap-
ter.
a. In order for its judgment to be recognized and enforced
under this Convention, the rendering court must declare that its
judgment comes within the scope of the Convention. A party may at
any point in the proceedings request the court to so declare.
b. In order to be recognized, a judgment referred to in para-
graph 1 must be recognized in the State of origin.
c. In order to be enforceable, a judgment referred to in
paragraph 1 must be enforceable in the State of origin.
d. However, recognition or enforcement may be postponed
if the judgment is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the
time limit for seeking a review has not expired.
e. The preclusive effect of a judgment shall be no greater
than its effect in the State of origin.
Article 24 Judgments Not to be Recognized or Enforced
A judgment based on a ground of jurisdiction which conflicts
with Articles 4, 5, 7, [or 8,] or whose application is prohibited by vir-
tue of Article 16, shall not be recognized or enforced.
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Article 25 Grounds for Refusal of Recognition or Enforcement
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused
if-
a. proceedings between the same parties and having the
same subject matter are pending before a court of the State ad-
dressed, if first seized in accordance with Article 12 or if consolidated
in accordance with Article 13;
b. the judgment is inconsistent with the judgment of the
court first seized, or if the actions were consolidated in accordance
with Article 13, the judgment is inconsistent with the judgment of the
court of consolidation;
c. the document which instituted the proceedings or an
equivalent document, including the essential elements of the claim,
was not notified to the defendant in sufficient time and in such a way
as to enable the defendant to arrange for a defense;
d. the rendering court's jurisdiction was based on a
nonnegotiated contract whose forum designation was unreasonable
under Article 4.3;
e. the judgment results from proceedings incompatible with
fundamental principles of procedure of the State addressed, including
the right of each party to be heard by an impartial and independent
court;
f. the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection with a
matter of procedure;
g. recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incom-
patible with the public policy of the State addressed;
h. where the rendering court's choice of law was arbitrary or
unreasonable, for example, where it applied a law lacking sufficient
significant relationship to the dispute. The conformity of the forum
to the jurisdictional terms of this Convention does not necessarily, of
itself, suffice to establish a significant relationship between its laws
and the dispute.
2. Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the pur-
pose of application of the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no
review of the merits of the judgment rendered by the court of origin.
Article 26 Documents to be Produced
1. The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement
shall produce -
a. a complete and certified copy of the judgment;
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b. if the judgment was rendered by default, the original or a
certified copy of a document establishing that the document which
instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to
the defaulting party;
c. all documents required to establish that the judgment is
enforceable in the State of origin;
d. if the court addressed so requires, a translation of the
documents referred to above, made by a person qualified to do so.
2. No legalization or similar formality may be required.
3. If the terms of the judgment do not permit the court ad-
dressed to verify whether the conditions of this Chapter have been
complied with, that court may require the production of any other
necessary documents.
Article 27 Procedure
The procedure for recognition, declaration of enforceability or
registration for enforcement, and the enforcement of the judgment,
are governed by the law of the State addressed so far as the Conven-
tion does not provide otherwise. The court addressed shall act expe-
ditiously.
Article 28 Costs of Proceedings
No security, bond, or deposit, however described, to guarantee
the payment of costs or expenses shall be required by reason only
that the applicant is a national of, or has its habitual residence in, an-
other Contracting State.
Article 29 Legal Aid
Natural persons habitually resident in a Contracting State shall
be entitled, in proceedings for recognition or enforcement, to legal
aid under the same conditions as apply to persons habitually resident
in the requested State.
Article 30 Damages
1. In so far as a judgment awards noncompensatory, including
exemplary or punitive, damages, it shall be recognized at least to the
extent that similar or comparable damages could have been awarded
in the State addressed. This rule does not apply to damages that are
intended to compensate the plaintiff but without requiring proof of
actual damages.
2a. Where the debtor, after proceedings in which the creditor
has the opportunity to be heard, satisfies the court addressed that in
the circumstances, including those existing in the State of origin,
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grossly excessive damages have been awarded, recognition may be
limited to a lesser amount.
b. In no event shall the court addressed recognize the judg-
ment in an amount less than that which could have been awarded in
the State addressed in the same circumstances, including those exist-
ing in the State of origin.
3. In applying paragraphs 1 and 2, the court addressed shall take
into account whether and to what extent the damages awarded by the
court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the pro-
ceedings, not otherwise covered by statutory provisions relating to
the awards of attorneys fees.
Article 31 Injunctions
1. In the ordinary course, injunctive relief is available; nonethe-
less courts may decline to enjoin activities within their territories if:
a. health and safety are at issue, or
b. the judgment conflicts with fundamental cultural policies
in the State where enforcement is sought, and
c. damages would afford an effective remedy for that terri-
tory.
2. In no event must a State recognize an award of injunctive re-
lief if such would not be required under the TRIPs Agreement, unless
the State addressed would have awarded injunctive relief under the
same circumstances. Should the rendering court decline to enter in-
junctive relief pursuant to this subsection, it must award compensa-
tory damages.
Article 32 Severability
If the judgment contains elements which are severable, one or
more of them may be separately recognized, declared enforceable,
registered for enforcement, or enforced.
Article 33 Authentic Instruments
1. Each Contracting State may declare that it will enforce, sub-
ject to reciprocity, authentic instruments formally drawn up or regis-
tered and enforceable in another Contracting State.
2. The authentic instrument must have been authenticated by a
public authority or a delegate of a public authority and the authenti-
cation must relate to both the signature and the content of the docu-
ment.
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Article 34 Settlements
Settlements to which a court has given its authority shall be rec-
ognized, declared enforceable or registered for enforcement in the
State addressed under the same conditions as judgments falling within
the Convention, so far as those conditions apply to settlements.
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COMMENTARY
Among other things, this commentary addresses provisions that
tailor the 1999 Draft of the Hague Convention to intellectual prop-
erty disputes. To the extent the Convention adopts language from
the 1999 Hague proposal, the applicable Commentary on those provi-
sions is that of Professor Catherine Kessedjian,a1 and of Peter Nygh
and Fausto Pocar. 12
Arts. 1 and 2: Substantive and Territorial Scope
In its substantive and territorial limitations, this Convention dif-
fers radically from the 1999 Draft Hague Convention. It does so for
reasons set out below. These limitations raise new problems, also
discussed below.
(a) TRIPs Limitation.
With a few possible exceptions the Convention is limited to dis-
putes over rights covered by the TRIPs Agreement. Furthermore, it
is open to signature only by countries that have joined the WTO and
are obligated to fully implement the TRIPs Agreement. There are
two reasons for these limitations. First, a recurring fear expressed in
connection with the draft Hague Convention is that litigants will en-
gage in forum shopping and use the courts of certain states to disrupt
the balance that other nations have struck between intellectual prop-
erty users and owners. Limiting the Convention to TRIPs rights
(with the exceptions and additions discussed below) and to TRIPs
implementers means that all litigation will be conducted in States that
have agreed to enforce the laws that will be at issue, that are amena-
ble to dispute resolution proceedings if they fail to fulfill their obliga-
tions fairly and adequately, and that have agreed to assure
transparent and efficient judicial process. Second, although dispute
resolution under the WTO cannot provide litigants with a substitute
for a centralized and authoritative appellate body (such as the US
Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice), it can provide in-
stitutional mechanisms (such as dispute resolution panels, the Dispute
Settlement Board, and the Council for TRIPs) for examining and
11. Catherine Kessedjian, Preliminary Document Nos. 7-10 & 12, at the website of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html.
12. Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commission on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, at the website of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law, http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited June 1,
2002) [hereinafter Nygh & Pocar Report].
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revising the law as it develops in litigation under the Convention.
These limitations do, however, raise two important problems.
(1) Line drawing. One concern with narrowing the scope of
the Convention in this way is that it will require difficult line drawing
and lead to satellite litigation over the question whether a judgment is
sufficiently related to TRIPs rights to qualify for enforcement. There
are several responses. Most important, the TRIPs Agreement is itself
quite broad: while it most prominently covers patent, copyright, and
trademark rights, it explicitly also applies to geographic indications,
industrial designs, layout designs, and undisclosed information (trade
secrets).13 Thus, the vast majority of commercially significant intel-
lectual property cases will be covered. Second, as noted below, other
claims-such as claims sounding in unfair competition-can be joined
with covered claims under the court's supplemental authority, see
Art. 9. Third, art. 2.1 of the TRIPs Agreement obligates members to
comply with arts. 1-12 of the Paris Convention.14 Art.1Obis of the
Paris Convention covers unfair competition, which is defined quite
broadly.15 Thus, the claims most typically considered part of intellec-
tual property law-claims for passing off, disputes over unregistered
trademarks and trade dress, claims akin to dilution, false association,
and misrepresentation, claims for trade secret violations and breaches
of confidential relationships, and claims of misappropriation-are all
directly within the scope of this Convention.
13. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 22, 25, 35, 39.
14. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998, AB-2001-7, WT/DS176/AB/R, pt. XI, 336 (Jan. 2, 2002)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report in the Havana Club case] (holding that the language of art.
2.1 of the TRIPs Agreement incorporates art. 8 of the Paris Convention), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org.
15. Article 10 bI indicates that unfair competition comprises "competition contrary to
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters." Paris Convention, supra note 6, art.
10ib( 2 ). Additionally, art. 10"(3) gives the following specific examples:
1. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;
2. false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to discredit the
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor;
3. indications or allegations the use of which in the course of trade is liable to mislead
the public as to the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the
suitability for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.
Furthermore, "honest practices" takes into account not only the practices existing in the
country where protection is sought, but also practices "established in international trade."
G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 144 (1968); see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2,
art. 39 (referring to art.10b of the Paris Convention).
2002]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
It is nonetheless possible that there will be situations where in-
tellectual property claims are embedded in other disputes. For ex-
ample, a case involving the sale of the assets of a corporation may
raise questions about the value of intellectual property assets. Anti-
trust cases sometimes also involve claims of patent misuse or invalid-
ity. Employment disputes can include claims about who owns rights
to information developed in the course of employment. Determining
which of these cases are within the scope of the Convention will not
always be easy. However, it is important to recognize that this prob-
lem is not uncommon in any litigation system in which there are
courts of specialized subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, it is not insu-
perable. Indeed, ways to solve it have developed.16
In the US system, for example, there is substantial jurisprudence
on choosing the cases that can be heard in a federal (as opposed to a
state) forum and also law on when an appeal from a court of general
jurisdiction is sufficiently patent-related to be heard by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In general, the allocation of jurisdic-
tion turns on whether the case "arises under" federal (or patent)
law.17 In American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., Justice
O.W. Holmes interpreted this language as meaning that "[a] suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action."18 However,
subsequent courts have regarded that test as overly inclusive. In the
intellectual property context, the formulation most often cited is that
of Judge Henry Friendly in T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu:
Mindful of the hazards of formulation in this treacherous area,
we think that an action "arises under" the Copyright Act if and
only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the Act,
e.g., a suit for infringement or for the statutory royalties for record
reproduction, 17 U.S.C. § 101, cf. Joy Music, Inc. v. Seeco Records,
Inc., 166 F.Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y.1958), or asserts a claim requiring
construction of the Act, as in De Sylva [v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570
(1956)], or, at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully, presents
a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal
principles control the disposition of the claim. 19
As a result of this narrowed conception of "arising under," the
claims in T.B. Harms-which concerned ownership of copy-
16. In Europe, these methods are currently evolving. See, e.g., Peter von Rospatt, Part
Two: Decisions of German Courts in Patent Infringement Cases with Cross-Border Effect, 29 IIC
504, 506 (1998).
17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1331, 1338 (2001).
18. 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
19. 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
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rights-were not considered within the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal courts. (It is important to note that the Copyright Act in ef-
fect at that time did not provide comprehensive treatment of owner-
ship issues).
In addition, the "well-pleaded complaint rule" is used to deter-
mine whether a complaint may be heard in a US federal court.2 0 Un-
der this rule, counterclaims, cross claims, issues arising in defenses, as
well as issues mentioned by the plaintiff but not legally required as
part of the complaint, are ignored for determining a trial court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
This is not the approach adopted here. Within specific jurisdic-
tional systems, courts with special subject matter authority tend to
work best when they are small enough for judges to stay in close con-
tact and abreast of one another's decisions. Constraints like those
found in US federal law further that goal by limiting dockets while
preserving enough cases to give each court sufficient power to influ-
ence the development of the law within its authority. But docket-
restraint is not an issue here. Indeed, the opposite is the case: since
consolidation and enforcement of foreign judgments save judicial
resources, the scope of the Convention should be broad.
For US federal trial courts, the well-pleaded complaint rule also
performs another function: it allows the allocation issue to be decided
at the earliest stage of the pleadings, before significant development
and resource expenditures have occurred. Again, this is not a con-
cern here because the parties will presumably want at least part of the
case adjudicated in the chosen forum, no matter what the interna-
tional ramifications of the judgment. Thus, there is no need to limit
coverage to the first claims that the plaintiff raises. So long as a case
mainly resolves intellectual property issues, it should fall within the
Convention, no matter who raised the claim and when in the initial
stages it was raised.21
20. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
21. In The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., - U.S. -, 122 S. Ct.
1889, 2002 WL 1155866 (June 3, 2002), the Supreme Court declined to interpret 28 U.S.C. §
1295, which controls the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, to permit appeal of a patent counterclaim to that court, even though that
tribunal was established to centralize patent appeals. However, the Supreme Court's reasoning
is not inconsistent with our approach. The majority posited that a purpose of the well-pleaded
complaint rule is to give the plaintiff mastery over the location of the appeal; allowing a
counterclaim to control the location of appeal would defeat that purpose. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens suggested that directing some patent appeals to other courts would
provide an antidote to the institutional bias that may develop in specialized tribunals.
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But even if the specific formulas proposed by Judge Friendly or
Justice Holmes are not apposite, the general approach they took is.
Thus, both essentially looked for an allocation rule that reflects the
rationale for drawing lines in the first instance. Friendly, for example,
alluded to "a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal princi-
ples control." 22 In this Convention, the concern is to make sure that
the courts where litigation takes place are committed to fair adjudica-
tion of intellectual property disputes. The notion, in short, is to con-
fine adjudication to courts whose records are subject to examination
by the WTO for bias or partiality. Accordingly, the determination of
what is within the scope of the Convention should turn on whether
the WTO nexus is of paramount concern to the parties, and whether
the outcome of the case would be of evidentiary value in WTO dis-
pute resolution. Under such an approach, a case that is primarily
about the sale of a business, or constraints on competition, or termi-
nation of employment, are not within the Convention's scope.23
Disputes involving ownership of covered intellectual property
rights present a more difficult issue. The proposal for a European
Patent Court excludes from jurisdiction claims of ownership and the
import of the T.B. Harms case was, similarly, to exclude ownership
claims from the scope of federal jurisdiction. Moreover, as the recent
Appellate Body Report relative to the Havana Club case notes, own-
ership is not directly covered by the TRIPs Agreement.24 Nonethe-
less, the efficiency and consistency goals that animate this proposed
Convention argue for including ownership disputes within its scope.
Some issues of ownership would be included in any event: those that
are based directly on intellectual property law provisions,25 and those
that arise in the context of infringement actions. 26 In addition, the
same Appellate Body Report found that the US had an obligation
under art. 42 of the TRIPs Agreement to permit the assertion of
ownership claims under domestic law. 27 Since the WTO dispute
resolution framework thus provides assurance of fair and transparent
22 T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828.
23. Cf. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, art. 46,
2000 O.J. (C 337) E/278 (stating that employer-employee relationships will fall under the
jurisdiction of national courts, not the European Patent Court).
24. Appellate Body Report in the Havana Club case, supra note 14, IT 139-148.
25. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001); Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
26. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d
Cir. 1998); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
27. Appellate Body Report in the Havana Club case, supra note 14, 218.
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process, ownership issues, even when presented alone, should be con-
sidered within the scope of the Convention.
Presumably, there will often be a point in the litigation when the
parties will need to know whether their case will terminate in a judg-
ment entitled to enforcement in all member States. They may only
need to learn this at the end, or they may need to think about it at the
stage where global claims might be consolidated, or issues of forum
selection arise. Because there will be marginal cases where the deci-
sion will be difficult (especially in the years before a jurisprudence on
the question has developed), Art. 23.1(a) authorizes the court hearing
the case to decide whether it comes under the Convention's enforce-
ment provisions, and it gives that court leeway to make this certifica-
tion as soon as the issue becomes important to one of the parties.
The certification procedure will not make drawing the line easier, but
it will give parties full notice of the effects of the judgment at the
stage at which they are making important strategic choices. Allowing
that question to come up in the court rendering the judgment has the
additional benefit of allowing this issue to be decided by the court
that is best acquainted with the litigation, rather than by a court try-
ing to determine the scope of the judgment for enforcement or res
judicata purposes.
(2) Claim splitting. Another concern is that a Convention pri-
marily limited to TRIPs claims will lead to bifurcation of cases and
thus, the expenditure of extra resources, as parties are forced to liti-
gate, or seek enforcement of, the intellectual property portions of
their cases in courts identified in this instrument, and to deal with
other parts of their cases in other places. Perhaps there will be such
situations, but the Convention will certainly avoid more duplicative
litigation than it will cause. In addition, Art. 9 of this Convention
permits the assertion of "supplemental" non-intellectual property
issues that arise out of the transaction or series of transactions or oc-
currence on which the original claim is based. Thus, for example, a
moral rights claim, which would not come within the express terms of
the Convention because it is not explicitly mentioned in the TRIPs
Agreement or incorporated in it,28 could be heard if it arose in a
transaction or occurrence that also gave rise to a claim within the
scope of the Convention.
28. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.1.
20021
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Here again, line drawing may be difficult and similar experiences
in national judicial systems may be helpful. In the US federal system,
the practice of permitting the assertion of transactionally related
claims took hold in Hum v. Oursler,29 where the plaintiff joined to a
claim for copyright infringement, a claim of unfair competition for
unauthorized use of the allegedly copyrighted play. Even though the
second claim was based on state law, it was adjudicated in federal
court, the theory being that these claims were "not separate causes of
action, but different grounds asserted in support of the same cause of
action." 30 That idea was expanded in United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica v. Gibbs to cover state and federal claims that "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact." 31 Significantly, the practice was
justified by "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants"-in other words, by the same concerns that ani-
mate this Convention.32
The Gibbs "common nucleus of operative fact" test was designed
to define when a case is within the constitutional authority of federal
courts. Constitutional authority is not a consideration here, however,
as the court's subject matter power over the dispute comes strictly
from national law. The role of Art. 9 is to determine when the judg-
ment is entitled to enforcement and for that function, the "transaction
or series of transactions or occurrence on which the original claim is
based" language is easier to apply since it is used in other contexts.
Furthermore, it is similar to the Brussels Convention's "arising from
the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based."33
Art. 9 gives courts discretion to dismiss supplemental claims
when they substantially predominate over intellectual property
claims. This procedure is derived from US federal jurisdiction law.34
It prevents a party from gaining the benefits of the Convention by
characterizing a case as within its subject matter scope, even though
the case has little connection to intellectual property rights.35
29. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
30. Id. at 247.
31. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
32. Id. at 726; see also Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 255 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a trade secret claim should be considered supplemental to a patent claim to avoid wasting
judicial resources and the potential for inconsistent outcomes).
33. See Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 6(3) (in both the current versions and the
revised version).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2001).
35. But see Breed v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 253 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding-in
a case that involved thirteen state claims and one claim to correct inventorship on a
patent-that any question of patent law brings an appeal before the Federal Circuit, no matter
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Once again, the unavoidable ambiguity in the terminology is
ameliorated by having the court hearing the case certify whether it
comes within the Convention at the first stage at which the issue be-
comes important.
(b) Exceptions.
There are three exceptions to the general rule that the Conven-
tion covers TRIPs rights: patents, which are excluded; and rights of
communication to the public in sound recordings, rights covered only
in the Paris Convention, and domain names, which are included.
(1) Patents. Patents are explicitly a part of the TRIPs Agree-
ment. The initial determination was to include them here, and to do
so even though the drafters of the Hague Convention were told that
registered rights -particularly patent-cases posed special problems.
Initially, these peculiarities did not appear insurmountable. The main
objections to covering registered rights were first, that registering and
maintaining registration are "acts of state" and foreign courts should
not upset another State's official acts; second, that the social costs of
patenting are so high (particularly for pharmaceuticals) that some
fora might become "information havens," over-eager to invalidate
patents on a worldwide basis; third, that both validity and infringe-
ment issues are too technical to be decided by courts of general juris-
diction; and fourth, that differing discovery opportunities could lead
to important differences in outcome, particularly on issues, like pri-
ority of invention, that are unique to the law of the US, where broad
discovery is available.
The first issue, act of state, is probably a red herring: if a State
signs onto the Convention, the State is agreeing to permit foreign
courts to examine its Acts. The "information haven" concern is, as
noted, substantially alleviated by restricting the Convention to TRIPs
implementers. In addition, limitations on the use of declaratory
judgment actions (Art. 8), their significance for choice-of-court pur-
poses (Art. 12.5(a)), and the power given courts through the consoli-
dation provision (Art. 13) should reduce concerns about forum
manipulation. The technical incompetence issue might be addressed
by limiting the consolidation of foreign patent actions to those States
that have specialized technically competent jurisdictions, like the US
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and similar courts in other
jurisdictions (Art. 14). Discovery problems could be dealt with by
how insubstantial the patent issue is relative to the rest of the case).
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making the prejudicial absence of adequate discovery a ground for
refusing enforcement and recognition (Art. 25). The draft has written
brackets references to these alternatives for patent actions.
Further deliberation, however, made it seem unwise to ignore
the objections of the patent bar. The patent laws of the TRIPs States
represent a greater range of substantive differences than do their
copyright or trademark laws. As a result, the technical difficulties in
these cases would be extremely challenging even for judges familiar
with local patent law. Resources are not saved by making a consoli-
dated case so complex, it can be decided only with difficulty and with
an increase in the risk of inaccuracy. Further, practitioners note that
there are places where validity can only be adjudicated in an expert
agency. It would be paradoxical to permit foreign courts to entertain
cases that could not be heard in the local courts of the country where
the right in question was registered. The costs of including patents in
the Convention are, in other words, very high.
At the same time, the benefits are low-or, lower than in copy-
right and trademark cases. Patent rights are more territorially
grounded than other intellectual property subject matter. Moreover,
patented products continue to be distributed mainly by physical
means: apart from software and business methods, patent infringe-
ments seem unlikely to occur by means of the Internet. So long as
state-by-state adjudication of rights remains viable, and the costs at-
tached to international enforcement appear high, it makes little sense
to treat patents the same as other intellectual property rights.
Some practitioners were also dissatisfied with the concept of
making patent actions exclusive to the forum where the patent right
was registered, as per the proposed Hague Convention.36 Their con-
cern is that this would freeze the law and prevent the development of
methods for efficient adjudication of worldwide patent actions.
Given the need for foreign enforcement that will arise in connection
with patented products that can be distributed on the Internet, simply
excluding patents from the scope of the Convention seems the wiser
course. Exclusion does not oblige consolidation or enforcement, but
it does not prevent these practices either.
(2) Sound recordings. The first proposed addition to the scope
of the Convention is to broaden the scope of protection for sound
recordings. These are not covered by the Berne Convention as it is
36. See 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 12(4).
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incorporated in the TRIPs Agreement, and the express provisions of
TRIPs extend only to reproduction and rental rights.37 At the same
time, however, there appears to be international consensus that sound
recordings should be protected, in at least some circumstances,
against unauthorized communication to the public.38
It remains to be seen whether the TRIPs Agreement comes to
incorporate other intellectual property instruments, either directly or
through recognition of the norms embodied in them.39 However, the
values represented by the Conventions regarding the scope of protec-
tion for sound recordings are so close to the principles recognized in
the TRIPs Agreement, it is difficult to believe that a State that fully
abides by its TRIPs obligations would not fairly adjudicate communi-
cation to the public claims over sound recordings. Including disputes
regarding copyright and neighboring rights in communications to the
public of sound recordings within the scope of this Convention has
the benefit of preventing the bifurcation of cases involving claims to
both the material on a sound recording and the recording itself, or the
bifurcation of cases involving reproduction and performance rights in
sound recordings.
(3) Domain names. Domain names are not yet clearly fully
protected by the TRIPs Agreement. However, the cases involving
domain names are based mainly on laws explicitly governed by the
TRIPs Agreement (for example, claims of consumer confusion, mis-
representation, dilution, or false association), or on laws with similar
concepts (for example, cyberpiracy laws). Because of the strong tie
between TRIPs commitments and the values embodied in domain-
name law, the WTO nexus is a significant check on the way courts
handle these suits. And because these cases have the same efficiency
and inconsistency problems that arise in international trademark and
copyright disputes, it was thought that they could usefully be included
in this Convention.
37. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 14.
38. See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 5; European Parliament
& Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, arts. 2(c), 3.2(b), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10;
see also the 1995 and 1998 amendments to the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1996 &
Supp. 2000).
39. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International
Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Neil W. Netanel, The
Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPs Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 441 (1997).
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One objection to treating domain names under the Convention is
that they can be conceptualized as equivalent to titles to land, with
the result that claims over ownership are truly local actions reserved
to the courts of the place where the domain name is registered. The
impetus for this conceptualization comes from a provision of US cy-
berpiracy law, which permits the owner of a trademark to file an in
rem action against a domain name in the judicial district "in which the
domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name
authority.., is located."40 For example, in Heathmount A.E. Corp. v.
Technodome.com, a Canadian trademark holder sued another Cana-
dian over ownership of a domain name in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia.41 Apparently, the notion was that the domain name was reified
at the place of registry, making the location of the registry the place
where the conflict had to be resolved. But even though the Heath-
mount court found it had in rem jurisdiction-that is, even though a
domain name can be reified in this way-there is nothing that says it
must be reified at all. In fact, the Cyberpiracy Prevention Act treats
in rem jurisdiction as an adjudicatory basis of last resort. It provides
that an in rem action is appropriate only if in personam jurisdiction
over the alleged owner cannot be obtained.42 There is, in short, little
reason to focus any more on the "property" dimension of domain
names than on the property dimension of other intellectual property
rights. The Convention takes the position that intellectual property
disputes are transitory and that an action can be brought where there
is adjudicatory authority over the defendant.
(c) Arbitral Agreements and Awards and the New York Con-
vention Limitation
This Convention also requires membership in the New York
Convention. In order to avoid the creation of conflicting rules on
enforcement of arbitral awards, this instrument leaves all such issues
to the New York Convention.
If domain names are included in this Convention, then reference
should arguably be made to the ICANN dispute resolution system. 43
40. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 43(d)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (1998 & Supp.
2001).
41. 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (E.D. Va. 2000).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
43. See ICANN Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.
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This system is, however, nonbinding.44 Accordingly, there is nothing
in that procedure that affects litigation under this Convention.
Art. 3: Defendant's Forum
This article is carried over from art. 3 of the 1999 Hague Draft.
The comments of Nygh and Pocar are fully applicable.
Consideration was given to add, as another definition for habit-
ual residence, "where the defendant has an effective business estab-
lishment, when that State is also the State of plaintiff's habitual
residence." This definition would have attempted a compromise be-
tween traditional concepts of habitual residence, and the US "doing
business" basis of general jurisdiction. ("Doing business" as applied
by US courts, is a prohibited ground of jurisdiction under this draft
Convention, see Art. 16.1(f).) However, the additional definition (in
effect, "doing business, plus") was not considered necessary in light of
Art. 6.2, which recognizes a broad geographic scope of jurisdiction
when the forum is plaintiff's residence, and when the infringing acts
were intentionally directed toward the forum.45
Art. 4: Agreements Pertaining to Choice of Court
Like art. 4 of the 1999 Hague Draft, this provision permits the
parties to select a forum for dispute resolution. The chosen court
must be one that has subject matter jurisdiction under local law. Un-
less otherwise specified, choice of court clauses will be read as creat-
ing exclusive jurisdiction, in derogation of the power otherwise vested
in other courts by this Convention. The court chosen may not decline
jurisdiction under Art. 13 (except as required by this Article). If the
case is consolidated under Art. 14, then the court chosen by the par-
ties should hear the consolidated case if it has subject matter jurisdic-
tion to do so. If it does not, then it should weigh the advantages of
honoring the parties' choice against the efficiencies to be obtained
through consolidation elsewhere.
This provision adds a feature to the 1999 Hague Draft in that it
handles unilateral forum designations in a new way. In the 1999
Draft of the Hague Convention, forum selection clauses are generally
enforceable.46 However, the effect of this provision was limited by
other articles. For example, while consumers are permitted to rely on
these agreements, a seller-imposed choice of forum clause is recog-
44. Id. $ 4(k).
45. See discussion of Art. 6, infra.
46. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
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nized only if the agreement was entered into after the dispute arose.47
In addition, a court was prohibited from exercising jurisdiction based
solely on "the unilateral designation of the forum by the plaintiff."48
The revised Hague Draft suggests some changes will be made in
this scheme.49 The prohibition on unilateral designations by plaintiffs
is eliminated and instead, the principal version of art. 4 now provides:
"Whether such an agreement is invalid for lack of consent (for exam-
ple, due to fraud or duress) or incapacity shall depend on national law
including its rules of private international law."
A footnote elaborates:
This proposal seeks to confirm that the substantive validity of
the choice of forum agreement is governed by the national law of
the forum seised, including its choice of law rules. It also seeks to
confine substantive validity to questions affecting the consent or
capacity of the parties as opposed to questions of reasonableness
and public policy.50
The revised draft continues to treat consumer contracts sepa-
rately.51 However, the new provision includes several alternative
proposals on choice of forum clauses. In general, agreements arising
after the dispute will be enforced, but there is now some flexibility to
enforce other agreements as well, so long as they conform to art. 4.
In some variations, the agreement must also be binding on both par-
ties in the place where the consumer was habitually resident at the
time the agreement was entered into. There is also a proposal to give
each member State leeway to enter a declaration on when it will en-
force the judgment of a court whose jurisdiction is solely based on a
designation in a consumer contract.
All of these proposals were rejected here. As was recognized in
the process of drafting the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act ("UCITA"), "prepackaged" contracts are important to a
variety of intellectual property transactions, particularly those in-
volving software. Licensing is critical to efficient exploitation of in-
tellectual works. So-called "shrinkwrap" or "click on" agreements
allow products to be tailored and priced for the needs of particular
47. Id. art. 7.
48. Id. art. 18(2)(g).
49. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Summary of the Outcome of the
Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001,
Interim Text [hereinafter Revised Hague Draft], at ftp://hcch.net/doc/jdgm200ldraft-e.doc,
reprinted in this issue at 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1015 (2002).
50. Id. art. 4 n.24. There are, however, variants to art. 4.
51. Id. art. 7.
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consumers; they facilitate online ordering and retail selling; they
lower the cost of doing business and hence, the price of products.52
As a result, generic prohibitions, such as the one found in the 1999
Hague Draft Convention,53 are not desirable. Nor is it appropriate to
rely on the domestic contract law of member States, as in more recent
drafts. Because forum selection is not a matter covered by the TRIPs
Agreement, there could be wide variation among member States on
enforceability. As a result, relying on local law will make it difficult
to predict the effect of a unilaterally imposed term, and this unpre-
dictability will, in turn, affect the ability of sellers to accurately price
their products. There are other undesirable consequences as well.
Use of the law of the forum first seized to determine enforceability
will surely lead plaintiffs to shop for a forum where the scrutiny of
such contracts is minimal. Relying on the law of the place where the
consumer is located is also unhelpful: many of these contracts arise
online, making the consumer's location difficult to determine. Be-
sides, consumer forum shopping (through, for example, use of a for-
eign service provider for making purchases) is no more desirable than
seller forum shopping.
Finally, to the extent special treatment for certain classes of
transactions is needed, it is not appropriately confined to consumers.
While it is true that consumers may require safeguards, the technical
nature of certain forms of intellectual products (like software) means
that there are buyers who are not ordinarily considered consumers,
who nonetheless need marketplace protection.54
This Convention therefore takes a different tack. First, it defines
a class of "nonnegotiated contracts," which are subject to special scru-
tiny regardless of whether they are entered into by consumers or by
businesses. These are contracts arising in transactions for informa-
tion products where the terms are entirely pre-packaged. Since the
seller is not willing to tailor these agreements to the needs of end-
users, it is these contracts that, in the intellectual property industries,
present the need for special safeguards. Thus, there is no separate
provision for consumers. 55
52. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, prefatory note (2000), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucital200.htm [hereinafter UCITA]; see also ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir.1996).
53. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 18.
54. See UCITA § 102 cmt. 39.
55. For other consumer protections, see Art. 7.2, supra, and comment to Art. 7, infra.
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Second, this Convention creates its own law for determining
when a forum designation will be honored: the forum must be a rea-
sonable choice, in light of the criteria set out in subsection 3. Impos-
ing a uniform rule on all forum selection clauses should largely
eliminate the possibility that plaintiffs will shop for courts lenient on
adhesion contracts. A uniform law also makes it unnecessary to
know where the consumer consummated the deal. Most important,
the listed criteria should influence party behavior and the substance
of the contracts terms offered. Because one of the criteria looks to
whether the forum would have been appropriate in the absence of a
forum-selection clause, those who want to be sure their forum selec-
tion will be honored will presumably choose a forum that is conven-
ient to the other side and connected to the dispute.56
The guidelines of subsection 3 largely echo the concerns ani-
mating Art. 13 on consolidation and Art. 14 on circumstances for de-
clining jurisdiction. In all three areas, the idea is to choose a court
that is fair to all sides, in light of their resources and their capacity to
cope with travel and foreign language and procedure. In addition, all
of these sections are designed to channel cases to the forum most
suited to deciding the substantive issues arising in the dispute: a court
whose law is likely to apply to a substantial part of the litigation,
and-in the case of trademark [and patent] rights-the court best
positioned to deal with questions involving registration and the con-
sequences of an invalidity finding. Because many nonnegotiated con-
tracts arise through online sales, the parties are uniquely likely to
have some facility with the Internet. As a result, the availability of
online dispute resolution was added as a criterion that the court
should consider in deciding whether the forum choice should be hon-
ored.
56. Cf. Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Ocrano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocfo Murciano
Quintero 2000 E.C.R. 1-4941, 24, available at http://curia.eu.int/common/recdoc/indexaz/en/
c2.htm. In Oc~ano Grupo, the European Court of Justice held that
where a jurisdiction clause is included, without being individually negotiated, in a
contract between a consumer and a seller or supplier within the meaning of [Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993] and where it confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court in the territorial jurisdiction of which the seller or supplier has his principal place
of business, it must be regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Directive in so far as it causes, contrary to the requirement of good faith, a significant
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the
detriment of the consumer.
Id. The European Court of Justice went on to hold that the court first seized must determine
this issue of its own motion. Id. 26.
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Art. 5 Appearance by Defendant
Making appearance a basis of jurisdiction raises three enforce-
ment questions: what is the effect of a judgment rendered in the case
of an appearance in which the defendant does not challenge jurisdic-
tion; what is the effect if the defendant challenges jurisdiction; and
what is the effect of a judgment when the defendant defaults. This
provision must be read in conjunction with Arts. 17 and 21, which
also cover obligations regarding appearances and nonappearances.
1. Appearance without contesting jurisdiction. This provision
states the familiar rule that a party can waive objections to personal
jurisdiction.57 This is true of both domestic personal jurisdiction rules
and of the limitations on personal jurisdiction imposed by this Con-
vention. Thus, under Art. 5, subsections 1 and 2, a party is deemed to
submit to the court's authority if the party joins issue without con-
testing jurisdiction. Issue is joined when a defense on the merits is
filed. If the other conditions of the Convention are met, the judg-
ment is entitled to enforcement.
In general, Art. 21 gives the court where enforcement is sought
authority to verify the basis of the rendering court's authority. In the
1999 Hague Draft, art. 27 (which is the provision analogous to this
one) is unclear on the scope of this authority in the context of ap-
pearances. Under one reading, it seems that the enforcement court
must satisfy itself that the defendant was subject to the court of ori-
gin's authority under one of the other bases of jurisdiction listed in
the convention. In other words, it is not enough that defendant join
issue; the court of origin must have also enjoyed a "white listed" basis
of adjudicatory authority. However, in combination with the Hague
Draft's provision on appearance jurisdiction,8 it can instead be ar-
gued that appearances are on the "white list" of agreed bases of juris-
diction. This Convention is more explicit. It clearly rejects the first
approach of requiring an independent basis of authority. Giving the
defendant a chance to prevail on the merits, but to protest jurisdiction
in the case of a loss encourages sharp practice, prolongs proceedings
(itself a major problem in cases involving the use of information), and
multiplies cost to the other side. The ability to undermine a judgment
after it has been entered is particularly problematic in consolidated
57. This is in contrast to subject matter limitations: because these cannot be waived, Art. 4
recognizes forum selection clauses only when the designated court has adjudicatory authority to
hear the subject matter of the dispute.
58. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 5.
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adjudication, where considerable resources will have been devoted to
the case by the parties as well as by the judicial system. Accordingly,
if the defendant elects to defend, the jurisdictional basis of the ren-
dering court is not reconsidered: as under the second interpretation of
the Hague Draft, the appearance itself is a basis of jurisdiction. Art.
21.1 does, however, expressly provide that the obligations of the en-
forcing court are not diminished. It must verify that the defendant
did, indeed, choose to defend on the merits without protest.59
2. Appearance contesting jurisdiction. The draft Hague Conven-
tion is based on the assumption that defendants can contest jurisdic-
tion. 60 In most jurisdictions a defendant may simultaneously contest
jurisdiction and defend on the merits. In many places, the defendant
may even appeal an adverse jurisdictional finding at the same time as
the merits are appealed.
If the defendant wins the challenge to jurisdiction, there is no
problem: no judgment will be entered (or, if one was, it will be va-
cated). However, a difficult question arises when the defendant con-
tested jurisdiction and lost. At that point, the case will be tried and
both the judicial system and the parties will expend resources on it.
Thus, there is strong temptation to regard both the merits and the
jurisdiction issue as res judicata. A prohibition on collateral attack in
the enforcement court also encourages the parties to fully utilize the
appellate system within the jurisdiction of origin and promotes volun-
tary compliance with the judgment.
Nonetheless, both Hague drafts give the court where enforce-
ment is sought the power to reconsider the jurisdiction issue.61 How-
ever, the court is bound by the factual determinations of the court of
origin. Because proper jurisdiction is so critical to the fairness and
public acceptance of the entire international enforcement effort, the
utmost should be done to make sure that contested jurisdiction deci-
sions are rightly decided. Reexamination by a second court furthers
the interest in accuracy. It promotes careful procedures and reasoned
decisions by the court of origin (which has an incentive to protect the
59. For a similar position, see Revised Hague Draft, supra note 49, art. 27A.
60. See Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 47 ("Paragraph 2 [of art. 5] gives the
defendant the right to contest jurisdiction. Although the Convention does not seek to regulate
procedure, a legal system that did not recognise that right would be in conflict with the
Convention.").
61. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 27; Revised Hague Draft, supra note
49, art 27; see also PROPOSED FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT §
5 (2002).
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enforceability of its judgments). Finally, dual examination could
promote a dialogue among courts and thus more rapid development
of legal precedents in the jurisdiction area-a matter of considerable
importance in the early years of the Convention. Hague's restriction
on reexamining factual predicates represents an attempt to strike a
balance between the interest in finality and the interest in accuracy.
This Convention softens that restriction by making factual findings
presumptively correct. Some of the issues involved in jurisdiction are
mixed questions of law and fact; by making this a presumption, the
Convention enables the court addressed to reach these questions
more easily.
3. Default. Courts must have the power to enter default judg-
ments; to do otherwise would encourage nonappearance and deprive
plaintiffs of the opportunity to resolve their disputes. Thus, Art. 5
permits the court to enter judgment despite nonappearance. How-
ever, it is not appropriate for a court that lacks adjudicatory authority
to decide a case. Several safeguards are therefore supplied. In places
where jurisdiction can be examined sua sponte, Art. 5 directs the
court to independently scrutinize the plaintiff's assertions. Art. 17
gives the court further power to assure itself that its authority is not
predicated on a prohibited basis of jurisdiction when the plaintiff so
requests or national law so requires. Finally, Art. 21 gives the court
where enforcement is sought considerable authority to reexamine the
jurisdictional basis used by the court of origin: it must satisfy itself
that the plaintiff's assertions about jurisdiction are well-founded (sub-
section 3) and in making that determination, it is not bound in any
way by the original court's factual findings (subsection 2).
Nothing in this Convention (or, for that matter, in the Hague
drafts) explicitly requires either court to scrutinize the merits of the
plaintiff's case before entering or enforcing a default judgment. Of
course, in many places, judgment for plaintiff may not be rendered
until there is such scrutiny.62 Some jurisdictions also have rules that
permit defendants to set the default aside and take new evidence. 63
Because the resolution of intellectual property disputes can have im-
62. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2) (permitting hearings in cases where the plaintiff has
not asked for a sum certain).
63. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c), 60(b); see also 1 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY OF JANUARY 30, 1877, AND THE INTRODUCTORY ACT
FOR THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF JANUARY 30, 1877 AS OF JANUARY 1988, §§
330-47 (Simon L. Goren, trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1990); Alphonse Kohl, Romanist Legal
Systems, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 6, at 83 (Mauro
Cappelletti ed., 1984) (describing Dutch procedure).
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portant public consequences (for example, the publication of material
of great interest may be enjoined), there are strong arguments for
requiring the court of origin to look at the merits before entering a
default judgment and for imposing a duty on the enforcement court
to make sure this was done. But there are problems with that posi-
tion. It may impose new procedures on member States; it encourages
defendants to bypass the court of origin; and it opens the door to re-
litigation and to the examination by one court of another's proce-
dure.64 Besides, there are other safeguards in place to protect
defaulting defendants: Art. 18(1) requires the court of origin to de-
termine whether the defendant received sufficient notice to mount a
competent defense; Art. 26.1(b) requires the enforcing party to pro-
duce documentary evidence of notice; and Art. 25.1(c) gives the en-
forcement court plenary authority to deny enforcement if its
independent examination of the notice issue (both facts and law) in-
dicate that the defendant was not properly notified. Thus, it is only
knowing, voluntary default judgments that will be entered or en-
forced. Art. 25 also protects the defendant and the public interest by
providing grounds for nonenforcement in cases where the plaintiff
engaged in fraud or the judgment conflicts strongly with public policy.
Art. 6: Infringement Actions
This provision seeks to adapt the traditional fora for tort claims
(place of impact of the injury, place from which the harmful conduct
originated) to the digital environment. On the one hand, it enlarges
the scope of the forum's competence in the case of multiterritorial
infringements. On the other, it limits competence when the defen-
dant has endeavored to avoid acting in a particular territory. Simi-
larly, it would insulate Internet access providers from amenability to
suit in fora for which the provider's sole contact is the automatic and
unmediated transmission of communications initiated by and destined
for others.
Art. 6.1(a), designating the competence of "any State where the
defendant substantially acted (including preparatory acts) in further-
ance of the alleged infringement," recognizes that an infringement
may originate in States other than the one in which the defendant
resides or has its principal place of business. For example, defendant
may reside in State A, but make the alleged infringement available to
the public through a website located in State B. When jurisdiction is
64. Cf. Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
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asserted on this basis, the forum is competent to hear all infringement
claims arising out of the communication of the infringement from the
forum, whatever the territorial extent of the resulting infringements.
Art. 6.1, inspired by art. 10 of the 1999 draft Hague Convention,
adjusts to the intellectual property context that draft's innovation,
which makes general territorial competence in certain tort actions
turn on whether the forum is the plaintiff's residence. 65 Under the
approach suggested here, any State to which the alleged infringement
was intentionally directed, will be competent to adjudicate not only
claims arising from forum impact, but also from impacts in other ju-
risdictions, subsections 6.1(b), 6.2. "[I]ntentionally directed, including
those States for which defendant took no reasonable steps to avoid
acting in or directing activity to that State" means that the defendant
sought to communicate the allegedly infringing content to that State,
or at least did not turn away customers who responded to the
availability of the communication in that State. This provision also
seeks to cover situations in which the initiator of the communication
has located its principal place of business and/or the means of
communication in the intellectual property equivalent of a "tax ha-
ven," that is, a country known or expected to be particularly forgiving
of the defendant's activities. The relative paucity of a domestic mar-
ket for goods or services provided by the defendant, compared with
the market in countries to which the communication was intentionally
directed may suggest that defendant has localized its business with an
eye to forum manipulation.
Art. 6.1(c) applies the traditional rule of competence of the place
of the impact. When this forum is not the plaintiff's residence, that
forum's competence is limited to adjudicating claims arising out of
infringements occurring within its territory, see Art. 6.3. A further
limiting principle is provided by specifying that this forum will not be
competent if the "defendant took reasonable steps to avoid acting in
or directing activity to that State." That language refers to efforts to
screen out access from particular jurisdictions, for example, by re-
quiring users to identify their country of residence, and excluding us-
ers from countries to which the defendant does not wish to
communicate. 66 Technological measures that make it possible to limit
65. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 10(4).
66. Cf. Torsten Bettinger & Dorothee Thum, Territorial Trademark Rights in the Global
Village-International Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Substantive Law for Trademark Disputes
on the Internet-Part Two, 31 IIC 285 (2000). The current draft revision of the Brussels
Convention also employs the "directed to" concept to identify competent fora of impact of the
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internet communications to particular countries may well be on the
horizon.67
It could be argued that these provisions violate US due process
norms, as articulated by the Supreme Court. For example, under
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,68 the combination of
place of impact and foreseeability of remote harm did not fulfill due
process standards. In contrast, however, Art. 6 aims specifically at
the activities of the defendant, not the "unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant."69 Recall
that, in fact, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court specifically acknowl-
edged that the manufacturer was amenable to suit in the forum; un-
like the local car dealership, the manufacturer sought to "serve,
directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States."70
Similarly, the person who intentionally directs an Internet transmis-
sion to foreign jurisdictions, without "taking reasonable steps to avoid
acting in or directing activity to that State," can be deemed to be
serving foreign markets. As it becomes increasingly easy to segment
the Internet, 71 it becomes ever more reasonable to subject to jurisdic-
tion a defendant who does not avail itself of opportunities to filter out
unwanted countries of receipt.72 Moreover, there is reason to believe
that a concern animating the World-Wide Volkswagen court was the
fear that the law of a remote jurisdiction might wrongly be applied to
the transaction.73 This proposal addresses the problem of inappropri-
ate choice of law in Art. 25, on enforcement of judgments.
Art. 6.4 attempts to address the concerns raised by Internet
service providers regarding the proposed Hague Convention. These
entities fear that the criteria enunciated in Hague's art. 10 could ren-
der them amenable to suit in any country through which a wrongful
communication transits or is received-effectively, the whole world.
alleged wrongful act.
67. See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There?: Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj
/articles/16_- 3/geist/geist.pdf.
68. 444 U.S. 286. 295-96 (1980).
69. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
70. Id. at 297.
71. See, e.g., Michael Geist, E-Borders Loom, for Better or Worse, Globetechnology.com
[hereinafter Geist, E-Borders], at http://news.globetechnology.com (June 28, 2001); Jack
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1213-16 (1998).
72. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (looking at
considerations of reasonableness to determine the assertion of jurisdiction in international
stream of commerce cases).
73. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
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Here, the criteria of Art. 6.1 should shield service providers, as these
criteria include an element of intent which a passive service provider
would lack. Art. 6.1(c) might at first appear more troublesome, as
receipt in or transit through any jurisdiction is at least foreseeable,
but the passive service provider generally is not in a position to
"avoid acting in or directing activity to that State." For that reason,
however, Art. 6.1(c) can be read as applying by its terms only to ac-
tors who, by virtue of their closer relationship to the communication,
can effectively take steps to avoid certain States.
Nonetheless, in order to clarify that a service provider should not
be amenable to suit in a given State on the sole basis of its passive
provision of connections, the language of the Online Service Provider
Liability Limitation Act,74 excluding the substantive liability of mere
conduit service providers for copyright infringement, has been
adopted. Similar language appears in the 2000 European Union E-
Commerce Directive, with respect to substantive liability in tort gen-
erally.75
A question remains whether a similar exclusion should be af-
forded other service providers, for example, proxy caches, and search
engines. Because the role of these actors is less passive, and because
they may be better situated to screen out certain fora, such a broad
exclusion may not be necessary.76
Art. 7: Agreements Pertaining to Intellectual Property Rights
Jurisdiction based on contractual activity has long been contro-
versial. There is considerable disagreement over the sorts of events
that trigger contacts with the forum sufficient to support jurisdic-
tion.77 In many situations, it may even be difficult to determine where
critical events took place. In online transactions, for example, a
buyer may enter a site through a foreign Internet service provider; to
74. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (Supp. 2001).
75. European Parliament & Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal
Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal
Market (Directive on electronic commerce), art. 12, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 12; see also Soc'y of
Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass'n of Internet Providers, [2002]
F.C.A. 166, $T 134, 186 (solving the ISP liability problem by separating substantive and
jurisdictional issues and holding that copyright royalties should be imposed on cache operators,
but not on other Internet providers; limiting jurisdiction to those servers having a "real and
substantial connection to Canada").
76. See, e.g., T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Order No. RG:00/05308 (crediting expert reports
that Yahoo! Inc.-the US entity-could have taken steps to prevent or discourage French web
users from accessing Nazi sites through Yahoo!).
77. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(discussing place of signing, place of negotiation, and use of bank accounts).
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the seller, the transaction may then appear to be with a person at the
location of the ISP. Normatively, the voluntariness of one party's
affiliation with the jurisdiction of the other side can depend on their
relative power, the structure of the market in which they are operat-
ing, and-for some information products-issues such as network
effects, lock in, and compatibility. Thus, general rules based solely on
buying and selling activities are unlikely to work well. The Nygh &
Pocar Report on art. 6 of the 1999 Hague Draft raises other issues,78
and the difficulty of this problem is also reflected in the many alterna-
tive proposals being considered in the process of revising the Hague
Draft.
This Convention takes a somewhat different approach. Rather
than start with an examination of specific activities, it looks at
whether the complaint raises contract issues. If it does, then it deems
the jurisdiction whose rights are in issue an appropriate place for the
litigation. Thus, if the contract dispute concerns the right to repro-
duce a book in France, it is French copyright rights that are at stake,
and France is therefore considered a jurisdiction where the case can
be adjudicated. While it is true that the defendant may not have been
physically present in France, the benefits gained from the protection
of French copyright law should be enough to support the specific ju-
risdiction that Art. 7.1 envisions. And since French law is likely to
play a role in deciding the case, this provision also has the advantage
of channeling litigation to the court with some (perhaps the most)
expertise in resolving the dispute. Another key benefit of this ap-
proach is that in the typical consumer case, this provision will steer
the adjudication to an acceptable location: the place where the work
is used, which is to say, a place where the consumer is located. Con-
sumers are further protected by Art. 7.2, which imposes an overriding
test of reasonableness in the case of nonnegotiated contracts.
Some contracts encompass rights under more than one country's
law. In conformity with the general policy favoring consolidation
which underlies this Convention, that possibility is dealt with in Art.
14, which directs the dispute to the forum with a close connection to
the dispute. In the case of contractual disputes,, the factors consid-
ered include the residence of the parties, the place where the obliga-
tions are performed, and the place where the intellectual property
was developed.
78. See Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 48-50.
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Art. 8: Declaratory Judgments
Actions for a declaration of rights are particularly important to
the intellectual property industries because commercialization often
entails substantial investments. Without the ability to bring "negative
declarations" that permit a court to declare a particular product un-
protected or within the scope of a license, these investments would
have to be made without knowing whether the information was actu-
ally available for the investor's use. Should the investor guess wrong,
sunk resources would be wasted.79 At the same time, it is not desir-
able for investors to shy away from using material that is in the public
domain: there is, in fact, a strong public interest in the exploitation of
material that is not properly the subject of intellectual property pro-
tection.80 Art. 8.1 furthers these private and public goals by creating
an avenue for clarifying rights.
At the same time, however, declaratory judgment actions raise
special procedural problems because they open forum shopping op-
portunities to would-be defendants. An example is the "Italian tor-
pedo," discussed below in connection with Art. 12, in which a
declaratory filing is made in an Italian court, where dockets move
slowly, in order to block adjudication of an infringement action in a
forum more likely to quickly award injunctive relief. To avoid misuse
of declaratory judgment actions, Art 12.5 refrains from treating a
court hearing a declaratory case as the court first seized for purposes
of the lis pendens doctrine. [Furthermore, Art. 8(2) requires that
actions for declarations of patent invalidity be brought in the State
where the patent was registered.] In this way, the Convention allows
a rights holder to trump the declaratory plaintiff's choice by bringing
79. The investment Kodak made in instant cameras is a good example of improvident
investment. After the cameras were long on the market, Polaroid successfully sued for
infringement. Kodak, its employees, and customers were all seriously hurt. See Polaroid Corp.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Daniel F. Cuff, Kodak Reports a
Loss After Taking Writeoff, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1986, at D6 (reporting forced withdrawal from
the instant camera field after patent ruling costing Kodak $494 million); Thomas J. Lueck, The
Talk of Rochester; A City Nervously Waits for Layoff News, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1986, at B1
(describing losses to Kodak and its workers resulting from enforcement of Polaroid's instant
camera patent against Kodak).
80. Compare Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994), where the court stated:
Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public
through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of
copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible. To that end, defendants who seek
to advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate
them to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of
infringement.
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its own action; the court where the rights holder sues is then treated
as the court first seized.
[The principal use of this provision in patent litigation is likely to
be as a mechanism for challenging patent validity. An argument
could be made that even if patent infringement actions are included
within the scope of the Convention, actions invalidating them should
be excluded. The theory is that an attack on registration should be
treated as a local action, and that it should therefore be heard only in
the place issuing the right. This position is rejected here: all intellec-
tual property claims are considered sufficiently transitory to be heard
in any member State's courts. However, Art. 8.2 recognizes that the
State of patent registration is the most appropriate forum to hear a
case whose object is to declare that registration improper. Art. 8.2
should be read as without prejudice to the power of a court hearing a
coercive action (such as an infringement action) to determine patent
validity (for instance, should it come up as a defense). Separating
adjudication of validity from infringement prevents a court from
hearing all of the evidence relevant to the action and from using its
understanding of how a technology is utilized to inform its decision
on the scope of the right. Bifurcating validity and infringement would
also increase expenses for the parties.
Another way to handle the registered-rights problem was sug-
gested by Curtis Bradley at the behest of the US State Department
negotiators of the Hague Convention.81 He would distinguish be-
tween rights among individuals and rights against the world. Parties
would be allowed to litigate their entire case in any forum that has
jurisdiction under the general terms of the Convention. However, if
the case is litigated outside the State where the right was deposited or
registered, the "status or validity of the deposit or registration of...
rights [would have] effect as between the parties only."82 This ap-
proach was rejected because the distinction between rights against a
party and rights against the world is illusory. Experience shows that
once the court of one commercially significant jurisdiction declares a
patent invalid, the patentee cannot easily enforce the right, or coun-
terpart rights, against any other party. Furthermore, licensees who
continue to honor the patent then compete at a disadvantage with
81. See Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the Effect of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Work Doc. No. 97E, 39, 122 (Nov. 10-20, 1998) (copy on file with authors).
82. Id. Doc. No. 122.
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respect to the judgment winner. The result is that the patent does not
serve its intended purpose of stimulating innovation by rewarding
innovators.]
Art. 9: Counterclaims and Supplemental Claims
This section contemplates a broad right in all litigants to add
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. The main
reasons for this rule are to facilitate consolidation and to prevent the
narrow scope of this Convention from requiring parties pursuing
claims or enforcing judgments to proceed in several fora simultane-
ously. The rule should not, however, be used in a way that permits
parties to gain the benefits of the Convention for claims outside the
scope of intellectual property. For that reason, Art. 9 gives courts
discretion to dismiss supplemental claims when they substantially
predominate over intellectual property claims. As noted above, this
procedure is derived from US federal jurisdiction law.83
Under this provision, judgments on related causes of action will
be entitled to enforcement if the other requirements of the Conven-
tion are met. The ability to add supplemental claims is, however, also
a matter of the domestic law of the court seized with the action. It is
significant to note that as global usage of intellectual property in-
creases, courts have come to recognize as within their subject matter
jurisdiction foreign claims, so long as they arise from transactions that
also implicate local rights.84 However, courts are prone to dismiss
these cases on forum non conveniens grounds. That subject is taken
up below, in connection with Art. 14.
Although the general approach of this draft Convention strongly
favors consolidation of claims (see commentary to Arts. 10-14), it
does not go further and require compulsory joinder of related claims,
nor does it impose stringent rules of res judicata that would regard
omitted transactionally related claims as precluded. Although US
law so provides, such is not the rule in most countries; to impose it
here would lead clients who are advised by attorneys unfamiliar with
the US system to inadvertently lose their rights. Under this Conven-
tion, plaintiffs may-but are not required to-present all claims aris-
ing out of the transaction including those that sound in foreign law.
Similarly, defendants may-but need not-present counterclaims
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
84. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d
Cir. 1998); Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 1997 1 S.L.R. 621 (Sing. C.A.); Aztech
Sys. Pte, Ltd. v. Creative Tech., Ltd, 1996-1 S.L.R. 683 (Sing. High Ct.).
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arising under foreign laws. As a result, parties who wish to resolve all
their claims in a single forum may do so, but they cannot use res judi-
cata law to curtail other parties' abilities to preserve their claims.
The net intended effect of Art. 9 is this: so long as the main
thrust of the case is the enforcement of intellectual property rights,
and supplemental claims presented by the parties are within the
court's subject matter jurisdiction and not the subject of litigation in
another forum, then the court seized with the action should hear the
entire case.
Arts. 10-14: Streamlining Adjudication: multiple defendants;
third party claims; lis pendens, consolidation; exceptional
circumstances for declining jurisdiction
One difference between the Brussels and Lugano Conventions,
on the one hand, and drafts of the Hague Convention on the other, is
that the former allow courts other than the one first seized to suspend
proceedings when related claims are pending in several fora.85 There
is scant discussion of this omission in the Reports issued in conjunc-
tion with the 1999 draft Hague Convention. One can, however,
speculate that such a provision was omitted because consolidation has
not proved popular in European practice. 86 According to one com-
mentator, Europeans tend to view "a civil proceeding more as an effi-
cient adjudication of the plaintiff's claim than as an equitable
resolution of a dispute or, as in the United States, of an entire 'trans-
action or occurrence.5" 87
Nonetheless, as economic transactions become globalized, con-
solidation will undoubtedly prove increasingly necessary to achieve
efficient resolution of disputes. Significantly, despite the present lack
of European practice, the revised Brussels Convention retains a con-
solidation provision.88 For intellectual property, consolidation is es-
pecially important. Rights in intangible works can easily be utilized
85. See Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 22; Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art.
22.
86. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention
and Progress in National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 218 (2001) (citing Samuel P.
Baumgartner, Related Actions, ZZPINT. 3 at 207-10 (1998)).
87. Baumgartner, supra note 86, at 210 (footnotes omitted). This view may be changing
among continental jurists, see, e.g., Coin Controls Ltd. v. Suzo Int'l (UK) Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 660,
678-79 (noting also that absent challenges to patent validity, patent claims derived from the
same European Patent Office prosecution should be treated as related, if not the same, see id. at
673); cf. Expandable Grafts P'ship v. Boston Scientific, B.V., [1999] F.S.R. 352 (Hof (den
Haag)), 19 (consolidating cases when the defendants are part of the same group of
companies).
88. Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 28.
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around the globe, especially when they are embedded in products
(such as digitized text files) that are themselves intangible. Because
multiple infringements in multiple jurisdictions can result from such
distributions, the ability to consolidate actions in one forum would
save significant resources not only for the parties, but also for the
international judicial system as a whole.
A more economical approach to multinational disputes may also
curtail recent judicial tendencies to expand the reach of domestic laws
to cover foreign infringements. 9 Extraterritorial application of law
has become worrisome to many observers because it interferes with
sovereign authority by limiting the extent to which a State can control
the local conditions under which information is produced, utilized,
and accessed. Further, by imposing one jurisdiction's law on activity
in another location, extraterritorial application also undermines the
TRIPs Agreement's principles of nationality and minimum standards.
Litigants who maneuver a court in their home country into providing
them with remedies they would not be awarded in another country
receive better treatment then rights holders in that other country. As
a result, the standards for protection in the second country in effect
become the standards of the first. However, as long as it remains dif-
ficult for intellectual property holders to pursue their rights (because
of costs, or difficulties in acquiring jurisdiction over defendants in
territories where there are claims), courts will likely make up for the
shortfall by finding that local law covers distant activity.90 Permitting
consolidated adjudication of worldwide claims facilitates efficacious
resolution on a worldwide basis, and might thereby temper the extra-
territorial impulse.
Equally important, consolidation provides a way to avoid incon-
sistent results. Because intellectual property law is not harmonized
among contracting States, certain differences in outcomes are inevi-
table. Some are also tolerable. For example, an invention may be
held patentable in one set of countries and not protectable in others.
So long as the right at issue can be exploited only by embedding the
knowledge in physical products, there will be few problems associated
89. See, e.g., Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2nd Cir. 1988)
(applying US copyright law to infringements in Israel that resulted from an initial reproduction
of the work in the United States); see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, The Private International Law
of Copyright in an Era of Technological Change, 273 RECUEIL DES COURS 322-48 (1998).
90. See generally Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in
Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 19-20, 27-28
(1999).
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with this apparent inconsistency: people who make, use, sell, offer for
sale, or import a product in a country where it is patented will need
authorization, even though the same usage could take place without
permission elsewhere. However, there are cases where differing out-
comes are not acceptable. For example, so long as the Internet re-
mains geographically unsegmented,91 or entrepreneurs seek to engage
in global marketing, multiple ownership of a trademark used on the
Internet can confuse consumers, damage the integrity of protected
signals, and harm the reputation of rights holders. Similarly, a deci-
sion by one State's court to permit the streaming of copyrighted ma-
terial can be undermined if another State enjoins it as infringement.
In such cases, it would be useful for one court to hear the entire
worldwide dispute, and to find a resolution that can accommodate all
interests at issue.92 No one jurisdiction is likely to write law that ex-
pressly deals with multinational disputes; consolidated litigation pro-
vides an important way for this law to evolve. 93
The ability to consolidate related world actions also furthers the
goals of the TRIPs Agreement. While it is true that every member
State is required to protect intellectual property rights,94 the Agree-
ment has a much looser standard regarding enforcement: countries
are not required to treat intellectual property cases any differently
from the way they "enforce their laws in general."95 In countries
where courts are backlogged, rights holders may find that they cannot
quickly end infringement. But if these claims could be joined to a suit
pending in a court capable of acting quickly, then the effects of over-
burdened litigation systems will be attenuated.
It has been suggested that facilitating consolidation of claims and
recognition of judgments also has negative consequences. One argu-
ment is that it will result in greater enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights and hence, lead to reduced usage of information. Under
this view, tolerance of infringements is desirable, particularly for re-
mote (and perhaps less affluent) jurisdictions. The problem for less
developed countries is easily dealt with. This proposed Convention is
91. This is changing, however. See, e.g., Geist, E-Borders, supra note 71; Goldsmith, supra
note 71.
92. Finding this outcome is a matter of the selection of an appropriate law to govern the
entire transaction. This issue is discussed in connection with Art. 25, infra.
93. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000).
94. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9.
95. Id. art. 41(5).
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open only to WTO members whose obligations to implement the
TRIPs Agreement have accrued. As in TRIPs, the obligations of
these countries can be minimized.96 And, as noted earlier, consoli-
dated treatment may reduce the incidence of high-protectionist States
extraterritorially extending their law to low-protectionist countries. If
it does, then the special treatment TRIPs affords developing econo-
mies may be better effectuated through this provision than otherwise.
More generally, consolidation has, in fact, benefits for both users
and rights holders. It preserves litigation resources and reduces op-
portunities for harassment. The recent example of the litigation be-
tween a large computer software developer, Computer Associates
("CA"), and a much smaller competitor, Altai, illustrates the point.97
CA initiated a suit in New York for infringement of the copyright on
a computer program. After losing, CA brought another action, aris-
ing out of substantially the same transaction or occurrence, in France.
Altai was obliged to defend in both places, the Second Circuit having
refused to enjoin the parties from pursuing the French claim on res
judicata grounds. The court reasoned that French law applied to that
claim, making it different from the one asserted in the US. The court
also observed that one of the parties to the French action would not
have been subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, even had CA
pleaded the French copyright infringement as part of its action in
New York. Under the approach proposed here, CA could have con-
solidated both claims in the New York federal court, because this
Convention provides for personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendants when there is a substantial connection between the forum
State's intellectual property rights and the dispute involving that de-
fendant, or when the forum State is the only one in which all claims
could be consolidated (see Art. 10). Moreover, even had CA wished
to retain the option of pursuing Altai in more than one forum, under
this Convention, Altai could have raised the alleged French infringe-
ment as a declaratory judgment in the US proceeding (forum non
conveniens no longer being available as grounds for dismissal in this
instance, see Arts. 8 and 14).
96. See, e.g., WTO, Draft Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, art. 5(b),
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) (noting the right of member states to use compulsory
licensing and exhaustion rules to promote public health); id. art. 7 (extending deadlines for
compliance with certain measures for least-developed countries); WTO, Draft Ministerial
Declaration, art. 42, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1 (Nov. 14, 2001) (acknowledging the need to
specially consider the integration of least developed countries in to the trading system).
97. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Other negative consequences that have been suggested mirror
the concerns expressed in the United States in connection with class
actions, which also involve the aggregation of claims. Thus, commen-
tators have worried about the effect of requiring a single court to ap-
ply the law of many states, noting that it could produce inaccurate
results. 98 Some are concerned that courts will avoid that problem by
stretching to find a single law applicable, in derogation of other le-
gitimate interests.99 Still others have claimed that aggregation confers
undue power on plaintiffs, arguing that the downside risk of liability
can lead defendants to improvident settlement of meritless claims.100
The public-regarding component of intellectual property law could
make such settlements-which may not be judicially re-
viewed -especially troublesome.
Nonetheless, the position taken here is that these problems can
be reduced to the point where they are outweighed by the benefits of
efficiency and avoiding inconsistency. As has also been noted in con-
nection with class actions, both sides are equally affected by aggrega-
tion: knowing that it only has one chance to win, plaintiff is also under
pressure to settle.101 Indeed, the recent case of Boosey & Hawkes
Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.102 supports the point. After
the Second Circuit consolidated claims under eighteen nations' copy-
right laws, the case settled-for substantially less than was sought in
the original complaint.103 Adjudication can be simplified by struc-
turing it carefully: factual issues can be tried first, and then legal is-
sues can be determined sequentially, on a country-by-country basis.104
When a set of States all have the same law on a particular issue,
claims under all these laws could be tried together.OS In some situa-
tions, one law may reasonably be applied to an entire dispute. Fur-
thermore, experience with consolidated international cases may give
courts the skill to find ways to further the interests of all relevant
98. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Market Approach to Tort Reform
via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 909, 910 (1995).
99. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 820-21 (1985); Spence v. Glock,
227 F.3d 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2000); see generally Austin, supra note 90.
100. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 547 (1997).
101. See Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1386 (2000).
102. 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
103. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT ch. 3.B.2. (6th ed. 2001).
104. Cf. Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 101, at 1382.
105. For a series of suggestions on how to structure complicated cases, see Larry Kramer,
Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996).
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States, and to do so without sacrificing broader interests in informa-
tion dissemination.10 6
It is also important to remember that class actions are materially
different from the aggregation device proposed here. The parties
choose their own attorneys, obviating concerns about the adequacy of
representation and the possibility of "sweetheart" deals that sell out
the class for the benefit of the lawyers. More important, because of
fundamental clashes among the laws of the States affected and the
current insufficiency of law to deal with the Internet, settlement may
represent the best chance of resolving the dispute equitably. The
parties may, for example, be better positioned than a court to find a
way for them all to utilize their trademarks in a nonconfusing way in
cyberspace.07 If this is so, then the added inducement to settle cre-
ated by aggregation should be counted as a benefit. In any event, the
court first seized is directed to decline consolidation if the benefits of
efficiency cannot be obtained because of concerns over manageabil-
ity.
Both the US and EU have ways to avoid a multiplicity of suits
over the same issues, but in both places, current practice makes com-
plete consolidation rather difficult. On the one hand, the Brussels
and Lugano Conventions avoid parallel litigation on identical causes
of action through the lis pendens doctrine.108 They also permit the
court of a State where one defendant is domiciled to avoid the risk of
inconsistent judgments by asserting jurisdiction over other defen-
dants, so long as there is a connection between the forum State and
the dispute.109 In addition, the presence of a domiciled defendant and
106. Consider, for example, Yahoo.!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,
169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), which held unenforceable in the US a French order
requiring Yahoo.com to prevent French users from reaching websites selling Nazi memorabilia.
Id. at 1194. The US court's articulated justification was to uphold First Amendment values. Id.
However, the result of its decision may be that the French authorities block all communication
with Yahoo, thereby depriving French residents of the opportunity to access other information
on Yahoo.com's site-surely a result even less friendly to free expression interests.
107. Significantly, such has also been the thinking of the WIPO. See Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs,
on the Internet (with Explanatory Notes), art. 13, WIPO Doc. 845(E) (adopted by The Assembly
of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General Assembly of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) at the Thirty-Sixth Series of Meetings of the
Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, Sept. 24 to Oct. 3, 2001) (giving the user of a
trademark an opportunity to propose to the court an effective remedy prior to a decision on the
merits of the case).
108. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 21; Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 27. The
Hague drafts include a similar provision. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 21.
109. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 6.1 (and related case law); Revised Brussels,
supra note 7, art. 6.1; 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 14.
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connection between the State and the dispute permits the assertion of
adjudicatory authority over third-party defendants for contribution
and indemnification under local law.1n0
Despite these provisions, consolidation of intellectual property
disputes cannot always be achieved in Europe for several reasons.
First, the Brussels and Lugano Conventions operate on the "assump-
tion that there exists a fundamental jurisdiction based on the domicile
of the defendant with the result that all other jurisdictions must be
seen as exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted.""' Second,
they remit claims concerning the validity of a registered right to the
country where the right is registered.112 The combined effect of these
two principles is that there may be no member State able to entertain
all aspects of a multinational infringement case. In addition, the ab-
sence of a robustly functioning doctrine of forum non conveniens and
the inflexibility of the lis pendens rule mean that even if there is a
court with power to consider the entire case, it may be difficult to
bring suits involving related causes of action to that forum.
In the US, the possibilities for consolidation are in some ways
better. Since there is no hierarchy among the courts with power over
the litigants, there is often a range of locations where a dispute could
be adjudicated. Because the parties to an action are forced by joinder
rules, res judicata law, and related doctrines to assert all transaction-
ally related claims,113 the full range of issues requiring adjudication
will be aired in a judicial proceeding somewhere. The courts seized
then have an array of transfer tools to bring related parts of the dis-
pute together, at least for some purposes.1U4
In certain ways, however, the situation in the US is worse than in
Europe. Lis pendens as a doctrine is not known. Although both state
and federal courts can control parallel litigation by staying or enjoin-
ing second-filed proceedings, they are not under a clear obligation to
do so. Moreover, there are circumstances where these doctrines are
110. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 6.1; Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 6.2; 1999
Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 16.
111. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 28.
112. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 16(4); Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art.
16(4); Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 22.4.
113. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13 (recognizing certain counterclaims as compulsory); Marrese v.
Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (claim preclusion).
114. Within the federal system, these include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406, 1407 (2001). State-to-
state transfers can be achieved through the doctrine of forum non con veniens. See, e.g., Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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not available."Is As a result, there may be instances when courts will
lack power to prevent multiple suits on the same or related claims.
Most important, the power of US courts to fully consolidate multi-
jurisdictional disputes appears to be heavily constrained by due proc-
ess concerns: it is said that, in every case, there needs to be a
volitional relationship between every defendant and the forum
State.11 6 Thus, there may be situations where all relevant parties can-
not be joined in a single action.
This proposal takes advantage of pro-consolidation features in
both systems, and does so in a manner that should not raise constitu-
tional objections in the United States. One important part of pro-
moting consolidation is the removal of constraints, such as those
found in art. 12(4) of the 1999 draft Hague Convention and art. 16(4)
of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions,117 on adjudicating registered
rights cases outside the jurisdiction where the rights are registered.
But the main consolidation features are Arts. 10-14, which are in-
tended to operate as follows:
Art. 10. Multiple Defendants
Like art. 14 of the 1999 draft Hague Convention, this proposal
empowers any jurisdiction in which one defendant is habitually resi-
dent to hear claims involving other defendants when the forum has an
interest in the dispute and there is a risk of inconsistent judgments.
The commentary of the Nygh & Pocar Report on the operation of
this provision and on why limitations were placed on the joinder of
multiple defendants is relevant here, with two caveats.
(a) Inconsistent judgments (subpart 1(a)). This term requires
elaboration because legal materials use it in many different ways, sev-
eral of which are difficult to apply to intangible rights that can be en-
joyed nonrivalrously. Thus, in the Hague commentary, the term
115. See Burbank, supra note 86, at 213-15 (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936)
(stay); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961) (injunction)). Burbank
notes that in effect, a lis pendens doctrine operates among federal courts. Id. at 213. However,
the abstention doctrine that the Supreme Court articulated in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), combined with the Anti-Injunction
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2001), prevent federal courts from dealing with parallel state court
litigation. Burbank, supra, at 213.
116. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984). Significantly, the Hague negotiators dropped the multiple-party
and third-party jurisdiction provisions from the latest draft, at least in part because of concerns
over whether the assertion of such jurisdiction would raise due process concerns in the United
States.
117. This provision is retained in art. 22(4) of Revised Brussels, supra note 7.
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sometimes means that two courts find the facts of the case differently.
In other places, it means the parties are subject to different obliga-
tions (for example, one judgment requires a debt be paid, the other
relieves the defendant of the obligation to pay). In the US, inconsis-
tency is sometimes defined rather stringently: two judgments are in-
consistent only when it is impossible for the parties to conform to
both.118 The proposed Convention would adopt all of these views of
inconsistency. However, in order to fully respond to the special
problems presented by the public goods aspect of intellectual prop-
erty, it goes even further to include the situation in which the judg-
ment of one court would undermine the law and policy of other
member States.
Consider as an example of these differing approaches, the facts
of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV,119 where television
signals from the United States and Canada were picked up in Canada,
and then streamed without authorization onto the Internet. Because
the defendants were Americans who retained contact in the US, but
centered their activities in Canada, suit for copyright infringement
could be brought in both countries. In such litigation, the courts of
both countries might rely on the same facts, but because of differ-
ences in law, each court could reach a different result on the question
whether the activity is infringing. The United States could decide the
activity is actionable, while a court in Canada could decide that the
copyright holder's interests were exhausted by the first transmission
of the work, or that the activity is protected under Canada's version
of the fair use doctrine. Are the outcomes inconsistent? Both courts
relied on the same facts, so there would be no inconsistency in fact
finding. There is an obligation to pay only for retransmission into the
United States, so there would be no inconsistency in obligations. Fur-
thermore, it is possible for the defendants to conform to both US law
and Canadian law by acquiring permission to stream. Nonetheless,
the differing outcomes are problematic. So long as effective barriers
to Internet sites cannot be erected, adhering to US insistence on
authorization raises costs or reduces access in Canada, and thus
trumps Canadian information policy. Of course, the defendants
118. See, e.g., Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Bait., 733 F.2d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 1984)
(interpleader case).
119. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, Nos. 00-121 & 00-120, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1013, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan 28, 2000); see also Copyright Infringement: NFL, NBA Seek to
Halt Retransmission of Telecasts; NFL v. TVRadioNow Corp., ANDREWS INTELL. PROP. LITIG.
REP., Feb. 9, 2000, at 4.
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might be able to stay out of the United States and avoid the effect of
its judgment, but then the Canadian outcome would trump US pol-
icy.120
Because one of the main benefits of consolidation is that it would
permit a court to consider these sorts of differences among national
rules and find ways to reconcile national interests, this is the kind of
problem that should trigger the joinder power. Thus, for purposes of
the proposed Convention, the "risk of inconsistent judgments" should
encompass this sort of clash between court judgments and national
policies.
(b) Due process. As noted above, a traditional US analysis of
personal jurisdiction would prevent a court from exercising jurisdic-
tion over defendants whose contacts with the forum are only those
described in art. 14 of the 1999 draft Hague Convention or art. 6(1) of
the Revised Brussels Convention. This is because the relationship
that is necessary under arts. 14 and 6(1) is the one between the forum
and the dispute, not the one between the forum and the defendant, as
per US standards. Apparently, the Hague negotiators were so con-
cerned that this provision could not be accepted in the US that they
eliminated this provision from the more recent draft of the Conven-
tion. To remedy the perceived problem while retaining the ability to
consolidate, Art. 10 proposes two different relationships as the basis
for asserting multiple-defendant jurisdiction.
1. Subpart 1(b). Defendants subject to jurisdiction under subpart
1(b) are those seeking to utilize intellectual property recognized un-
der forum law. While utilization of protected material does not cre-
ate a strong connection to the forum, it is a voluntary connection that
produces, within the forum, the effects of undermining the exclusive
positions of rights holders and licensees, attenuating the incentive
available under the intellectual property system, and-in the case of
trademarks-causing consumer confusion. Significantly, jurisdiction
based on an "effects test" has been recognized in the US in antitrust
and trademark cases, 121 and in other contexts as well.122 Typically, it
120. For further discussion, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the Intellectual
Property Bar: The Hague Judgments Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 421.
121. The "effects test" has been established in antitrust cases. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 795-96 (1993) (assuming that if there is legislative jurisdiction under
the Sherman Act, a US court has power to hear the case). It is also well known in trademark
cases. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.
2000).
122. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp.
2d 1168, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (asserting jurisdiction over the winning plaintiff in a French
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will have been alleged that the defendant committed an intentional
act; that was expressly aimed at the forum State; and that caused
harm, the brunt of which the defendant knew was likely to be suf-
fered in the forum State.123 In the cases contemplated here, the ef-
fects may sometimes be more attenuated. However, the interests of
the forum and of the judicial system as a whole strongly favor con-
solidation as a means to avoid inconsistent outcomes. While it is not
clear how much these interests matter in a due process analysis, the
combination of effects, the concern over inconsistency, and the US's
interest in maintaining the value of its intellectual property rights may
be enough to tip the balance in favor of permitting the exercise of
specific jurisdiction.124 Further, to the extent that power over non-US
defendants is governed by international standards of reasonable-
ness,125 European reliance on this basis for asserting jurisdiction
should also militate in favor of allowing a court to exercise jurisdic-
tion in cases falling under this subpart.
2. Subpart 1(c). There may be situations where the commercial
benefit of activity in one territory is dependent on parallel acts in
other locations. In such cases, it could be that there are few partici-
pants who have contacts with all of the places where infringement
takes place, but the enterprise as a whole necessarily contemplates
contact in each jurisdiction. This provision is intended to enable a
court to fully resolve disputes arising from these "hub and spoke"
situations. Admittedly, contact between the forum and certain de-
fendants will be extremely attenuated. Nonetheless, it should be con-
sidered sufficient, even in the US. It is akin to the conspiracy theory
of jurisdiction that has been used by US courts in other contexts.126
Moreover, while the Supreme Court has never expressly approved a
concept of "personal jurisdiction by necessity," the Court has allowed
the limits of due process to be stretched when there would otherwise
be no forum in which the dispute could be adjudicated and where
action on the theory that enforcing the judgment will affect the US plaintiff in the French case).
123. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998)
124. See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950).
125. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(j) (1987) (stating that "a
state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate ... is reasonable if... the person, whether natural
or juridical, had carried on outside the state an activity having a substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect within the state").
126. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 904, 912 (N.D.
11. 1999) (antitrust law); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692, 694-97 (D.D.C. 1973) (action
against a religious sect); see generally Ann Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish
In Personam Jurisdiction: A Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 234 (1983).
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there is some contact between the defendant and the forum.127 Here,
the defendant will have affiliated himself with an enterprise deriving
benefits from the forum's intellectual property and with a party who
is a forum resident. Again, to the extent that jurisdiction over aliens
is determined by international standards of reasonableness, the fact
that defendants in this situation would be subject to jurisdiction under
European law should be relevant.28
As to both parts, it has been suggested by William Dodge that it
may be possible to meet US domestic due process requirements using
a general doing business theory (even though the Convention pro-
hibits asserting jurisdiction on this basis) and to meet the Conven-
tion's requirements under the multiple-defendant provision. 29
Art. 11 Third Party Claims
This provision is taken from art. 16 of the 1999 Draft Hague
Convention and is adapted to make clear that third parties can be
summoned to the jurisdiction only when they have entered into a re-
lationship regarding the intellectual property of the forum, thus
making the assertion of jurisdiction over them reasonable. The com-
ments of the Nygh & Pocar Report, along with the commentary
above on Art. 10, are relevant.
Art. 12 Lis Pendens
Because the jurisdiction rules in this Convention will often point
to more than one location with power to hear a case, provision must
be made to avoid parallel litigation. Americans are comfortable with
solving this problem by giving courts discretion to decide on an ap-
propriate forum.130 However, there is profound disagreement on this
issue in other places. The practice in Europe, for example, is to give
absolute preference to the court first seized. Once it is determined
127. Compare Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960, 966 (Cal. 1957) (en banc), with
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958). See also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (1950). Note
also that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also contemplate some stretching of jurisdictional
limits. Thus, there is nationwide jurisdiction in interpleader actions, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (2001) and
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(1)(C); and jurisdiction over defendants in federal question cases that is
based on national contacts when there are not sufficient contacts with any one state, FED. R.
CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
128. See, e.g., Expandable Grafts P'ship v. Boston Scientific B.V., [1999] F.S.R. 352 (Ct.
App. The Hague, Apr. 23, 1998). This so-called "spider in the web" theory of jurisdiction has
not, however, been approved by the European Court of Justice. See Fritz Blumer, Patent Law
and International Private Law on Both Sides of the Atlantic, WIPO Forum on Private
International Law and Intellectual Property (2001), at http://www.wipo.int/pil-forum/en/.
129. William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 363, 378-79 (2001). See also the discussion of contacts in the context of Art. 6
on infringement actions, supra.
130. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2001).
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that this court has jurisdiction to hear a case, other courts entertain-
ing the same cause of action must suspend proceedings, and if the
other case goes forward they must ultimately decline jurisdiction.131
Courts entertaining related causes of action may, upon application of
the parties, also stay out, so long as the court first seized has jurisdic-
tion over these related claims.32 There is no authority to transfer the
resulting case to any other court. The 1999 Hague Draft is slightly
different. It establishes a presumption in favor of the court first
seized with respect to the same cause of action,133 but the presump-
tion can be rebutted when the court second seized, or in exceptional
circumstances, another court, "is clearly more appropriate to resolve
the dispute."34 (As earlier noted, the Hague Convention does not
have a consolidation provision.)
This proposal follows the Hague draft's lead. It too sets up a
presumption in favor of the forum first seized and it allows for rebut-
tal of the first-seized presumption. However, it requires consolida-
tion of exactly parallel litigation and expands the circumstances in
which the court first seized can decline the case. In situations where
litigation on related claims are pending in several fora, and strong
benefits could be obtained through consolidation, the court first
seized has the power to use discretion-informed by the parties-to
find a forum well suited to resolve the entire dispute.
The comments of the Nygh & Pocar Report on the 1999 Hague
Draft are relevant, with the following caveats:
(a) Scope of required consolidation. The 1999 draft Hague Con-
vention uses the term "causes of action," which the Nygh & Pocar
Report rightly points out can be confusing.135 Art. 12 clarifies the
concept, without expanding its scope (given the Report's expansive
definition), by referring to claims arising under a single territory's
intellectual property right, created through the defendant's alleged
activity. For example, in a dispute between a Mexican and an Ameri-
can over the latter's intentional use in Mexico of the former's intellec-
tual property, the case could properly be brought in the US (per Art.
131. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 21; Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art. 21;
Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 27.
132. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 22; Lugano Convention, supra note 7, art. 22;
Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 28. Under all three documents, related causes of action are
those that are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to
avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.
133. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 21.
134. Id. arts. 21(7) & 22.
135. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 85.
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3) or in Mexico (per Art. 6). If the court first seized is the US court,
then that court would be the only one authorized to hear the case. If
the defendant were to later file a declaratory action involving the
same claim in Mexico, the Mexican court would be required to sus-
pend proceedings and then dismiss the case after the US court ren-
ders judgment. In that way, the plaintiff's decision to sue in the US,
where the defendant's assets were located, would be honored and an
attempt to split the case would be foiled. Were the Mexican court to
nonetheless render a judgment, it would not be entitled to enforce-
ment, see Art. 25.1(b).
(b) Registered rights. Because the 1999 draft Hague Convention
assigns exclusive jurisdiction over registered rights cases to the State
where the rights are registered, certain intellectual property claims
cannot be consolidated in the forum first seized. To the extent that
this proposal subsumes registered rights, it facilitates a higher degree
of consolidation.
(c) Declaratory judgment actions. Art. 12.5 creates an important
exception to the presumption in favor of the court first seized. It does
so because declaratory judgment actions present special problems.
As both the Hague drafters and the ALI's International Jurisdiction
and Judgment Project recognize, these actions could be used by a
potential defendant to preempt a plaintiff's choice of forum and to
defeat the jurisdiction of the most appropriate court.136 In litigation
involving information products, this problem is particularly severe.
Because information cannot easily be withdrawn once released, in-
junctions can be especially important; declaratory actions in courts
hostile to preliminary injunctive relief can deprive rights holders of a
critical remedy. In Europe for example, "Italian torpe-
does"-declaratory judgment actions in Italian courts-are used to
prevent the courts in other European countries from issuing trans-
border injunctions in patent cases. 137 They may even be used to pre-
vent local injunctions from issuing in other countries. 138
136. See id. at 87-88; PROPOSED FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
ACT § 8 (2002) and associated commentary.
137. See Robin Jacob, The Deioma Lecture: International Intellectual Property Litigation in
the Next Millennium, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 507, 511 (2000); Paul A. Coletti, No Relief in
Sight: Difficulties in Obtaining Judgements in Europe Using EPO Issued Patents, 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 351,367 (1999).
138. See Trevor C. Hartley, How to Abuse the Law and (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-
Faith Proceedings Under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in LAW AND
JUSTICE IN A MULTI-STATE WORLD: A TRIBUTE TO ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 73 (James A.
R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002).
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To prevent this especially corrosive kind of forum shopping, this
provision follows the Hague draft's lead by allowing a court seized
with a coercive action -typically, an action for intellectual property
infringement-to disregard the presumption in favor of the court first
seized when the action in that court is solely declaratory. Instead, the
court hearing the declaratory case must suspend its proceedings and
allow the coercive action to go forward. 39 For instance, if the Ameri-
can in the previous example were to preempt the Mexican by bringing
a declaratory action in the Mexican court, (in an effort, perhaps, to
take advantage of docket congestion to delay judgment), a US court
later seized with an infringement action could ignore the action
pending in Mexico. In that situation, the first judgment entered
would be the one entitled to enforcement under this Convention.
(d) Negating the presumption in favor of the court first seized.
The 1999 draft Hague Convention includes two ways to rebut the
presumption in favor of the court first seized: through the forum non
conveniens doctrine,140 which puts several courts into play as the tar-
get of transfer, and through its provision of limited circumstances that
allow a court to transfer an action to the court second seized.141 Since
this Convention creates more liberal rules on transfer, there is no
need for a second way to rebut the presumption.
(e) Determining when a court is seized. As Nygh & Pocar note,
it is important to prevent ambiguity as to the time when a court is
seized. This provision is adapted from the Revised Brussels Conven-
tion,142 on the theory that its position is based on substantial experi-
ence with the 1968 Convention.
Art. 13 Consolidation
This article is based on the practice contemplated by the Brussels
Convention.43 It facilitates centralized adjudication of a multi-
national dispute through, essentially, transfer of related actions to a
single forum if consolidated proceedings would more efficiently re-
solve the dispute. The section also provides guidance on how that
139. This is in accordance with practice in the US. See, e.g., Elbex Video Ltd. v. Tecton
Ltd., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1947, 1949 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (refusing to follow the Second Circuit's first-to-
file rule by dismissing a case in favor of allowing the case to be heard by a California court
where a declaratory judgment action was filed on the ground that circumstances demonstrated
that the California action had been filed "in order to deprive plaintiff of its choice of forum").
140. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
141. Id. art. 21(7).
142. Revised Brussels, supra note 7, art. 30.
143. Brussels Convention, supra note 7, art. 22. This provision is carried over to art. 28 of
Revised Brussels.
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choice should be made. In general, cases would be consolidated when
there is a risk of inconsistent judgments (as previously defined) or
when other efficiencies will be obtained, and the benefits of consoli-
dation would outweigh the potential increased difficulty of managing
the litigation.
Once it is determined that cases should be consolidated, the next
question is, where. Although the lis pendens provision could be ex-
panded to centralize the dispute in the court first seized with the ac-
tion, thereby limiting judicial discretion in accordance with (what can
be perceived to be) the preferred approach outside the United States,
the rigidity of that solution was rejected. It would give the first plain-
tiff too much control over the litigation. More important, it would
sometimes situate litigation in a court ill suited to the task of dealing
with complex matters or in a court far removed from the center of
gravity of the dispute. At the same time, however, the controversy
over judicial discretion must be avoided. This proposal presumes that
when related cases are pending before several tribunals, the court
seized first will take the lead oar. Under Art. 13, the presumption is
that this is the court that will decide the case. However, Art. 14 gives
it cabined power to defer to another court. This procedure not only
adheres to a procedure with which much of the world is familiar, it
also avoids the prospect that courts will handle the related cases in
inconsistent ways.
As with the lis pendens rule, the consolidation provision is en-
forced through Art. 25.1(a) and (b). That is, if a claim is consolidated
in a particular court, then the judgment of any other court on that
claim is denied enforcement. The enforcing court is not free to re-
examine consolidation decisions: if, for one reason or another, some
related claims were not consolidated and instead tried separately, any
resulting judgments should be enforced.
Art. 14: Exceptional Circumstances to Decline Jurisdiction
This section, which is akin to the US practices of forum non con-
veniens and transfer, gives the court first seized power to defer to an-
other forum. As such, it does double duty. It guides a court in
determining whether another forum is a more appropriate place to
adjudicate a case, and it provides guidelines for deciding where a con-
solidated case should ultimately be heard. As in the 1999 Hague
Draft,144 a court's power to unilaterally refuse to exercise jurisdiction
144. 1999 Draft Hague Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
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is highly circumscribed: the circumstances must be "exceptional" and
the other forum must be clearly more appropriate. However, under
this Convention, it is not necessary-as it is under the Hague
Draft-to find that the court first seized is an inappropriate forum.
Again, too much rigidity would give an inappropriate level of power
to the first plaintiff; it would encourage races to the courthouse; and it
could prevent a court better suited to the task from deciding the case.
All of the grounds for finding a case exceptional that are found
in the Hague draft are included here. They are supplemented by
grounds needed to determine the most appropriate forum for con-
solidated adjudication.
(1) Factors for deciding to defer to another court in all cases.
Subsections 2 (a), (b), (c), (d): inconvenience, location of evi-
dence, limitations periods, recognition: These provisions are taken
from the 1999 draft of the Hague Convention and the Nygh & Pocar
Report provides the relevant commentary.145 As reported by Nygh &
Pocar, the court is to compare how well each of the litigants will fare
if the case is transferred. This requires consideration of the distances
the parties will be required to travel as well as each party's ability to
hire lawyers and to deal with unfamiliarity of procedure, substantive
law, and language. The court should, in other words, consider the
relative resources of the parties and their capacity to cope with the
demands of litigating in each of the potential fora. Also, since expe-
rience under the Brussels Convention demonstrates that fora can dif-
fer markedly in their capacity to clear their dockets, the court should
consider whether the case would be decided as speedily if it was adju-
dicated in a different forum. Note that the relevant issue is how fit
the parties are to deal with these issues; not how these matters affect
the outcome.146
Subsection 2(e): Significant relationship. This section contem-
plates the situation where it will be clear that a single State has a
closer relationship to the case than any other, and suggests that a fo-
rum in that State should entertain the case. For example, cases that
involve domiciliaries (habitual residents) of a single State or rights
under a single State's laws should, all other things-including the
relative resources of the parties-being equal, be moved to that
State;4 7 actions concerning contracts wholly negotiated in a single
145. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 91-92.
146. Cf. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981).
147. Cf. Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.Com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000)
[Vol. 77:1065
DRAFT CONVENTION
State should be adjudicated in the State where the contract was nego-
tiated; infringements that occur wholly within a single State should be
litigated there.
In addition, a court should consider deferring actions largely cen-
tered around the validity of registered rights to a court in the place of
registration. As noted in other places, this Convention rejects the
notion that intellectual property disputes based on registered rights
are local actions that can only be heard at the place of registration.
Nonetheless, in actions in which a main claim is that a right was im-
properly registered, the law of the place of registration will be of
prime importance. Moreover, the only courts that can easily control
invalidation, nullification, or revocation are the fora of the State of
registration. Thus, if registration is the main issue in a dispute, then a
court in the State of registration is likely to be the most appropriate
forum.
In some cases, particularly those involving consolidation, more
than one jurisdiction's registration will be in issue. But even in these
cases, there may be a most appropriate forum. For example, under
the Madrid Agreement, invalidation of a trademark registration in
the country of origin within five years of the international registration
date leads to invalidation of the trademark right in all other member
States.148 In a trademark case involving this provision, a court in the
State of origin should hear the case.
[Subsection 2(f): Expertise in patent cases. The patent bar has
been particularly wary of the Hague Convention because, among
other things, it is concerned about the complexity and technical diffi-
culties that patent cases present to lay judges. The bar points out that
national patent laws are more diverse from one another than are
other intellectual property laws. As a result, judges are less likely to
decide foreign patent cases accurately. Moreover, many jurisdictions
channel patent cases to specialized tribunals. The benefits of chan-
neling would be undermined if a foreign court were allowed to decide
some of these cases. Many patent lawyers thus do not see a role for
consolidation; they would prefer to have every patent case decided by
a court of the State whose law is in issue.
(questioning whether it would not be better to have resolved a domain name dispute between
two Canadians in Canada instead of in the US).
148. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891,
as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967 (amended 1979), art. 6.3, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available
at http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal-texts/pdf/madrid-agreement.pdf.
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These are, of course substantial problems. The Convention's ap-
proach to dealing with them is to give courts entertaining patent cases
authority to defer adjudication to courts with patent law expertise. In
cases involving the law of only one State, this will presumably be a
court in that State, producing the result the patent bar favors. In con-
solidated actions, the import of this subsection will be slightly differ-
ent. There are several States around the world that maintain
specialized tribunals for adjudicating patent cases. The UK Patent
Court (or the EU patent court that might take its place) and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are examples. The notion
here is that litigation in multinational cases should be directed to sys-
tems with these types of fora. Since most multinational disputes are
likely to include claims under the law of at least one State that has
such a court, this choice will usually be available. Admittedly, the
expertise of the judges on these courts is currently in their own coun-
try's patent law. However, their ability to handle technical materials
and their intimate knowledge of core patent principles (such as those
imposed on all member States by the TRIPs Agreement) would likely
make them at least as good at handling foreign patent cases as gener-
alist judges in the country whose law is in issue. Hopefully, this be-
nign form of forum shopping would institutionalize over time, so that
a specific set of courts would handle most consolidated patent ac-
tions.149]
(2) Additional factors to be considered in consolidated cases
Subsection 3(a): Authority over the parties. In many instances
where the claims are related enough to consolidate, Arts. 10 and 11
will give all (or most) of the courts where actions are pending author-
ity over all the defendants. But in cases where there are significant
differences in adjudicatory authority, the court chosen for consolida-
tion should, other things-such as resources-being equal, be the
court with adjudicatory power to hear as much of the worldwide dis-
pute as is possible.
There may be cases in which a court is asked to decline jurisdic-
tion because it lacks adjudicatory authority to consolidate all of the
claims that could potentially be asserted, and there is another forum
with the power to consolidate all those claims. In such cases the court
should take account of where the most significant economic impact
149. Cf. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?. 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903 (2001) (showing that patent cases in the United
States tend to channel to ten judicial districts).
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lies. Thus, while another court may have power over more parties (or
more claims under subsection 3(b)), the court first seized may none-
theless choose to retain jurisdiction because it is the forum of the
most significant economic impact.
Subsection 3(b): Authority over the subject matter. As noted ear-
lier, although this Convention facilitates joinder, it does not require
member States to alter the subject matter jurisdiction of their courts.
Accordingly, one factor in determining the right court is whether the
parties can assert all claims relating to the transaction, including
claims based on foreign law. By the same token, this is a factor in
choosing the forum for a consolidated action: the court chosen
should, all other things being equal, be one with the power to handle
as much of the dispute as possible. See also the above comment to
subsection 3(a).
Subsection 3(c): Contract cases. As noted in Art. 7, multinational
contract disputes should be adjudicated in the forum with the most
significant relationship to the contract.
There may cases where jurisdiction under this provision raises
fairness (due process) concerns. In the US, for instance, it could be
argued that if, say, a suit encompasses rights under US, German, and
Japanese law, then it is general, rather than specific, jurisdiction that
is at issue. As a result, more contacts with the forum are necessary.
But as the discussion of consolidation elaborated, there are strong
reasons to believe that even US concepts of due process would be
satisfied. The contract is the "but for" cause of the litigation, thus an
argument could be made that jurisdiction is specific even in the case
of multinational rights. Moreover, the cases that involve rights under
several countries' laws will typically be commercial contracts and the
parties will have multiple contacts with the jurisdictions at issue.
They will also be parties with enough sophistication to use forum se-
lection clauses whenever it is important to be certain of the forum in
advance. The interests of the parties and judicial system in efficient
resolution may also come into play in the analysis.
Factor 3(c)(2), the country in which the intellectual property was
developed, is new and thus requires further discussion. The notion is
that the act of licensing a work with an obvious national identity is
enough contact with that nation to support jurisdiction. Further, be-
cause one of the principal functions of intellectual property law is to
stimulate and shape the creativity of a nation's citizenry, the country
where the work was developed has a very strong interest in the dis-
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pute and perhaps even insights, and access to the evidence, needed to
resolve it. For example, the decision to make a film of a French book
written in France by a French national, is a voluntary and foreseeable
affiliation with France; if the dispute raises questions of authorship, it
is French law and French materials that will likely be in issue. Given
this intent, the country of development should be understood as en-
compassing factors such as the place where the work was physically
created, developed, or invented; the residence and nationality of the
person or commercial entity most closely responsible for the work's
existence; the place where the work was first utilized, published, or
registered. In some cases, these factors will point in several direc-
tions. If that is the case-if the work has no readily identifiable
locus-then this criterion should not be utilized to determine
jurisdiction.
An argument could be made that the better approach would be
to fully incorporate into this Convention the "country of origin" con-
cept that is already familiar to the international intellectual property
bar. That position was not adopted. First, each international instru-
ment uses the term differently. For example, the main criterion of
origin for copyrighted works under the Berne Convention is the place
of first publication;150 the Paris Convention defines the country of
origin for trademarks as "where the applicant has a real and effective
industrial or commercial establishment, or ... his domicile, or ... the
country of which he is a national";151 in the EU's Satellite and Cable
Directive, the country of origin is the place where the signals were
introduced into the chain of communication.152 Second, the term is
not in general use in connection with certain of the rights that are
covered by this Convention. Third, to the extent first publication is
the main criterion, it is problematic for cases involving Internet dis-
tribution because the place of first publication is not always determi-
nate (or particularly relevant).153 Accordingly, this Convention
rejects first publication as a sole criterion. The factors it uses are not
entirely unknown: as noted above, they are used in the Paris Conven-
tion; they are also used in the Berne Convention for unpublished
150. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(4)(a).
151. Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 6 q
ui
n
qu i
es
.
152. Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the Co-Ordination of Certain
Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to Satellite
Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15.
153. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality and Authors'
Rights in a Networked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 351-52
(1998-1999).
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works. 54 One factor that could be adopted from the labeling context
is the rule that every good has only one country of origin, no matter
how many sources of inputs were involved. However, such a proce-
dure would not appear to further the goal of finding the best forum to
resolve the dispute.
(2) Nondiscrimination.
Nationality and habitual residence. Section 4 bars the court con-
sidering whether to decline jurisdiction from taking into account the
nationality or habitual residence of the parties. The comments of the
Nygh & Pocar report are relevant as these factors are carried over
from art. 22 of the 1999 Hague draft.155
Foreign law. Section 5 bars the court from considering the pres-
ence of foreign law. This is new to this Convention. It was included
because otherwise, the goal of consolidating worldwide claims, which
is a key motivator of this proposal, would be undermined.
Today, it is common practice for common law courts that have
forum non conveniens discretion to dismiss foreign claims within their
subject matter authority.156 This Convention would require a change
in that practice, but it would also significantly weaken the rationales
that support it. Thus, one justification is that intellectual property
actions are local, not transitory causes. Adoption of this Convention
necessarily represents a rejection of that theory. Another theory is
154. Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5(4)(c). There are "country of origin" definitions
in other statutes as well. For example, the US federal marking statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1304,
requires every item imported into the US to be marked in a manner that indicates "the country
of origin of the article." Australia's Free Trade Practices Act similarly requires country of
origin representations on imported products. See Alexander Moriarty, Australia: Trade
Legislation-Country of Origin Product Labeling, 5(3) INT. T.L.R. N17 (1999). International
trade agreements have similar requirements. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement,
Dec. 17, 1992, art. 311, 32 I.L.M. 289, available at the Organization of American States website,
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/naftatee.asp. However, the definitions provided in these
agreements are not appropriate here. First, there is no general international agreement on a
single definition. Second, these measures apply to tangible goods, where the main problem is
determining how much transformation in the state of the goods is necessary to change the
country of origin designation. Transformations are sometimes a problem in intellectual
property (a book can be transformed into a play, for example). However, the main problem will
often be that the work is created by mingling multiple international inputs. Cf. Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and
Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2000). Thus, the rules used for goods are not apposite.
155. See Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 92.
156. See, e.g., Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287 (2d Cir. 1996) (copyright);
Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. Pte., Ltd., 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995) (copyright). Cf. Mars
Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign patent claims). For commonwealth examples,
see Plastus Kreativ A.B. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., [1995] R.P.C. 438, 447 (Eng. Ch.
1994); Potter v. Broken Hill Proprietary Co., (1906) 3 C.L.R. 479, 492 (Austl).
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that intellectual property laws are "public rights." Again, the deci-
sion to join this Convention means that a State agrees to allow for-
eign courts to construe and apply its intellectual property laws. Some
courts consider foreign rights too difficult to adjudicate. While that
may be a factor in patent cases, the convergence of the other
branches of intellectual property law make this a weak reason to dis-
miss foreign copyright or trademark claims, or the claims that come in
under the unfair competition rubric.157 Moreover, courts are in-
creasingly called upon to apply foreign law, even when local rights are
in issue.158 Finally, courts may be motivated to dismiss foreign claims
because they are concerned that they will spend time on a case only
to find their judgments unenforceable. Joining this Convention obvi-
ates much of that concern. To the extent it survives, it should be
ameliorated by the court's power under Art. 14.2(d) to choose a fo-
rum that can render an enforceable judgment.
Art. 15: Jurisdiction Based on National Law
This provision is carried over from art. 17 of the 1999 Hague
Draft and the comments of Nygh & Pocar apply. Like the Hague
Convention, this Convention contemplates a grey area, where courts
may exercise jurisdiction, but the parties cannot expect that the
judgment will be enforced. Enforcement in these cases will depend
on basic principles of comity.
Art. 16: Prohibited Grounds of Jurisdiction
This proposal adopts most of the prohibited grounds of jurisdic-
tion set out in the 1999 Hague Draft, notably the "doing business"
basis, see Art. 16(1)(f). As indicated in the Comment to Art. 3, how-
ever, Art. 6.2's provision for expanded territorial competence, when
the infringement impacts in the forum of plaintiff's residence, should
provide many of the general jurisdiction advantages sought by US
litigants' resort to the "doing business" basis of jurisdiction.
This Convention refines one of the Hague prohibited bases by
distinguishing tangible from intellectual property, Art. 16.1(a) and
(b). With respect to the former, tangible property directly related to
an infringement action would include infringing articles, such as pi-
rated books, phonograms, and videos, or counterfeit goods such as
false brand name watches. Relevant tangible property can also in-
clude the physical means for making the infringing goods or copies,
157. See especially Austin, supra note 90, at 42-43.
158. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir.
1998).
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such as computer hardware and media, recording equipment, and
other machinery. The kinds of physical devices whose presence in the
State may suffice to afford jurisdiction are generally the kinds that
courts are empowered to impound or destroy as a remedy in an in-
fringement action) 59
Art. 17: Authority of the Court Seized
See the discussion of Art. 5.
Art. 18: Verification of Notice
As noted earlier in connection with Art. 5, the Convention con-
tains two safeguards of the defendant's right to notice. This article
requires the court of origin to, sua sponte, stay proceedings until it is
established that the defendant received timely and sufficient informa-
tion about the case to prepare a defense. Because Art. 25.1(c) makes
lack of notice a ground for refusing to enforce a judgment, the en-
forcement court will also examine this issue. Unlike the double-check
on jurisdiction in Art. 21.2, the enforcement court is not bound by the
factual findings of the court of origin. The court of origin should,
however, determine the adequacy of notice under the law of the court
of origin.60
This provision was carried over from art. 20 of the 1999 Hague
Convention and the comments of Nygh & Pocar are fully applica-
ble.161
Art. 19: Provisional and Protective Measures
The time-value of information and the inability to return (or for-
get) what has been learned makes the availability of preliminary re-
lief particularly important in intellectual property disputes. This
provision offers courts a great deal of flexibility in insuring the main-
tenance of the status quo pending adjudication.
Art. 20: Definition of "Judgment"
This provision is carried over from art. 23 of the 1999 Hague
Draft and the comments in the Nygh & Pocar are applicable.162
Judgments of all courts of member States are to be enforced, no mat-
159. See, e.g., for US copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (forfeiture and destruction), § 509
(seizure and forfeiture); for US trademarks, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (destruction of infringing articles);
see also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, art. 46 (including in "other remedies" the "authority to
order that materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in the creation of
the infringing goods be... disposed of outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to
minimize the risks of further infringements").
160. There is a proposal to make this explicit in art. 28(1)(d) of the Revised Hague Draft,
supra note 49.
161. See Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 82-84.
162. Id. at 93-96.
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ter whether they are labeled orders, declarations of rights, decrees, or
judgments. However, they must resolve cases within the subject mat-
ter scope of this Convention. As noted in connection with Arts. 1 and
2, the narrow scope of this Convention could lead to ambiguities on
the issue of enforceability. These ambiguities can, however, be re-
solved at the request of the parties by the court of origin, see Art.
23.1(a). The decision is not subject to reexamination in the enforce-
ment court.
Art. 21: Verification of Jurisdiction
See the discussion of Art. 5.
Art. 22: Judgments Excluded
This provision again makes clear that courts may exercise juris-
diction on bases not prohibited by this Convention. However, if the
basis is not listed in the Convention, then enforcement is determined
by principles of comity. This provision is taken from art. 24 of the
1999 Hague Draft.163
Art. 23: Judgments to be Recognized or Enforced
The comments of the Nygh & Pocar Report, at 96-100, are rele-
vant here as well.
In addition, this proposal stresses the role of the rendering court
in declaring that its judgment comes within the scope of the Conven-
tion, Art. 23.1(a). Because this Convention endeavors to promote
consolidation of territorial claims, notably, by providing for supple-
mental jurisdiction over claims outside this Convention's subject mat-
ter when the claims arise out of the same transaction and occurrence
as the intellectual property claim, see Art. 13, courts may be enter-
taining a variety of "mixed" cases. Where the claim could be charac-
terized as an intellectual property claim or as a contract or other
related claim, the characterization may affect the applicability of the
recognition and enforcement provisions of this proposal. For exam-
ple, suppose jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of copyright in-
fringement, although a breach of contract claim has also been
pleaded. Under Art. 13, the court would be competent to adjudicate
both claims. In the course of the trial, it becomes clear that the dis-
pute is essentially a contract one. The court may retain jurisdiction,
but it might choose to decline to declare that its judgment comes
within the scope of the Convention, as a contract claim, divorced
from infringement action, would not come within the Convention.
163. See id. at 96.
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Art. 24: Judgments Not to be Recognized or Enforced
The provision is the analogue of art. 27 of the 1999 Hague
Draft.164 It represents one of the essential ways in which this Conven-
tion is enforced in that it bars courts from enforcing judgments predi-
cated on a basis of a prohibited ground of jurisdiction. Note that the
bar applies even if the court of enforcement is in the same jurisdiction
as the court of origin.
Art. 25: Grounds for Refusal of Recognition or Enforcement
Several of the grounds set forth are traditional and warrant no
comment beyond those offered by Nygh and Pocar1 65 Innovations
peculiar to this instrument are found in Art. 25.1(a), (b), (d), and (h).
In addition, the application to intellectual property cases of the bases
set forth in Art. 25.1(e) and (g) deserves commentary.
Art. 25.1(a) and (b) add to the draft Hague Convention's provi-
sion for nonrecognition of a judgment when the rendering court
should have suspended its proceedings pursuant to the lis pendens
provision (Art. 12 of this proposal), the further ground of consolida-
tion pursuant to Art. 13. In order to promote the goal of consolida-
tion, it is important not only to facilitate parties' applications to
consolidate, but also to discourage continued proceedings in other
fora once an action has been consolidated. An effective way to dis-
courage those proceedings is to deny recognition and enforcement to
any resulting judgment.
As with subsections 25.1(a) and (b), subsection (d) enforces an-
other provision of the Convention (Art. 4.3) by denying enforcement
of a judgment whose jurisdictional basis was created by a
nonnegotiated contract that designated a forum lacking a reasonable
relationship to the parties and the controversy. Again, the hope is to
motivate drafting parties to devise fair agreements.
Art. 25.1(e) permits refusal of recognition or enforcement if "the
judgment results from proceedings incompatible with fundamental
principles of procedure of the State addressed, including the right of
each party to be heard by an impartial and independent court." A
question may arise as to whether the unavailability of discovery or of
a jury trial in the action would be "incompatible with fundamental
principles of procedure of the State addressed" when that State has
jury trials. As most States do not afford civil jury trials, it is unlikely
164. See id. at 101-03.
165. See id. at 103-10 (commenting on art. 28 of 1999 Draft Hague Convention).
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that, as a matter of international norms, unavailability of a jury trial
would violate fundamental principles. Moreover, even in States
where jury trials are common, they may be regarded as necessary
only for adjudication in courts where they are expressly required. For
example, the Seventh Amendment's jury trial requirement is binding
in the courts of the United States (federal courts), but it has never
been viewed as binding in state courts. 166 Moreover, issues decided in
the absence of a jury may be binding for collateral estoppel purposes,
even in the proceedings of courts where a jury trial would have been
required on the precluded issue.167
The quality of discovery opportunities poses a more difficult
problem [, particularly in patent cases,] as there may be substantive
provisions of law that rely on a form of discovery available in the ju-
risdiction whose law is in issue, but not in the jurisdiction where the
case is tried. [An example from patent law is a defense of invalidity,
where the ground is that the patentee was not the first to invent, 35
U.S.C. § 102(a), and where laboratory notebooks may be a necessary
part of the proof.] In some cases, there may be opportunities for as-
sistance from other tribunals, such as under The Hague Convention
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
or pursuant to US federal law.168 However, where these procedures
are not available, and the failure of proof is attributable directly to
their absence, the court addressed should consider whether the ab-
sence gives rise to a lack of fundamental procedural fairness.
Art. 25.1(g) deals with incompatibility with the public policy of
the State of the court addressed. The Nygh & Pocar Report empha-
sizes that this is intended to describe a narrow category of cases.169
That observation is even more true of this proposal. This is not to
deny that intellectual property raises difficult policy issues: exclusive
control over information through copyright protection can violate
free speech norms and undermine the political process.170 For exam-
ple, the rendering court might prohibit the reproduction of a trade-
mark in the context of a political commentary depicting the
166. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND
FEDERAL 1121 (1999 ed.).
167. A US example is Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1994 & Supp. 2000); see generally Hans Smit, American Assistance to
Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited,
25 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1 (1998).
169. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 108-09.
170. See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
285 (1996).
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trademark on a t-shirt. Or it might enjoin the public performance of
a song parody. Patent rights have direct impact on health and
safety.171 Both patents and copyright can interfere with scholarly pur-
suits. Thus, Qimron v. Shanks,172 the Israeli decision holding a ren-
dering of the Dead Sea Scrolls copyrighted, has spawned considerable
controversy. This Convention has specific provisions to deal with
some of these problems in a structured way, see, e.g., Arts. 25.1(h),
30, and 31. These provisions should be relied on before resorting to
subsection (g).
In some cases, the clash between an intellectual property deci-
sion rendered by one court and the public policy of another State may
occur because the rendering court failed to carefully consider what
law ought to apply to the controversy. To the extent this is true, the
decision on nonenforcement should be made under subsection (h) of
this Article, and not here. The commentary to that subsection sets
parameters for determining whether an inappropriate law was util-
ized and therefore better frames the decision. More important,
making nonenforcement turn explicitly on choice of law will encour-
age courts to protect their decisions by articulating the basis for, and
justification of, their choice of law decisions. These opinions will also
create a dialogue among courts on how choices of law should be
made in an international marketplace.
The impact of intellectual property decisions on the State ad-
dressed can also be softened through the remedy provisions of this
Convention. Article 30.2(a) permits a court to reduce monetary
damages so that the relief does not exceed the level that would have
been awarded in the State of the court addressed. In that way, the
Convention makes sure that the decision to infringe is not any more
expensive than it would have been in the State where enforcement is
sought. At the same time, Art. 31.1 allows the court addressed to
refuse to enforce an injunctive order when health, safety, or funda-
mental cultural policies are at stake, so long as a monetary award can
be had instead. The approach of turning a property right into a li-
ability rule in cases of fundamental policy has lately been endorsed by
the United States Supreme Court.173 It is particularly appropriate in
171. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173.
172. C.A. 2760/93, 2811/93, Eisenman v. Qimron, 54(3) P.D. 817.
173. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); see also Abend
v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (1988) (finding "special circumstances" that would cause
"great injustice" to defendants and "public injury" were injunction to issue), affd sub nom.,
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an international setting, where cultural differences and levels of tech-
nological development are so widely disparate. Together, the remedy
provisions make sure that the level at which infringement is
deterred-or, the level of noncompliance with intellectual property
law-in the State of the court where enforcement is sought is not sub-
stantially altered by reason of its joining this Convention.
Given these other avenues for addressing policy concerns, sub-
section (g) should be reserved for cases where enforcing the judgment
would cause extreme-manifest-incompatibility problems. Permitting
nonenforcement (or refusing to enforce elements of a judgment, such
as an order for injunctive relief) under such conditions could, in fact,
be considered of a piece with the TRIPs Agreement, which also con-
templates the possibility that a general obligation imposed on all
member States could have a disparate impact for certain members.
Indeed, the provisions of TRIPs that deal with these situations could
be used to elucidate the determination of when a judgment is mani-
festly incompatible with public policy. For example, art. 27.2 of the
TRIPs Agreement permits a State to exclude otherwise patentable
subject matter from the scope of protection when "commercial ex-
ploitation.., is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, includ-
ing to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to the environment."
Similarly, art. 31(b) contemplates that efforts to obtain authori-
zation for certain usages can be waived in the case of national emer-
gencies or extreme urgency. Finally, all of the major provisions of the
Agreement permit limitations that do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the rights holder.174
Art. 25.1(h) makes choice of law a potential ground for refusal of
recognition or enforcement. While this is not a choice of law conven-
tion, the forum's choice of law rules are likely to influence what fo-
rum the parties choose. The issue of applicable law would therefore
need to be confronted, at least indirectly, at some point. By making
arbitrary and unreasonable choice of law a ground for nonrecogni-
tion, this Convention aims to supply an incentive to courts to apply
reasonable choice of law rules, and to reduce the fear that the territo-
riality of intellectual property rights will be lost. The text of the draft
simply suggests that laws lacking a significant relationship to the con-
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
174. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 13, 17, 30; see also WTO, Draft Declaration
on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, supra note 96.
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troversy are likely to be deemed unreasonable if applied. To elabo-
rate further, it is possible to identify what might constitute a
significant relationship, or its absence. In the case of registered
rights, countries other than those in which the right was registered
may have a significant relationship to the claim depending on the
facts of the case; failure to apply the law of the country in which an
intellectual property right was registered should not of itself furnish a
ground for nonrecognition of the judgment, except in cases involving
nullification of the registered right.
In general, the following are presumptively reasonable choice of
law rules in the digital distribution context, which is likely to be the
major source of cases under a Convention such as this one; courts that
depart from these rules should articulate justifications for departing
from them:175
1. The law applicable to the entirety of a defendant's alleged Inter-
net infringement is determined as follows:
a. If the allegedly infringing content is found on a website,
the law of the country in which the operator of the website
has its residence or principal place of business, or
b. If the allegedly infringing content is not found on a web-
site, such as through file sharing, the law of the country of
the residence or principal place of business of the person or
entity that initiated the communication.
2. Notwithstanding #1, if a third country is shown to have a more
significant relationship with the controversy-for example, if a
third country is shown to have been the principal target of the in-
fringing communication-then the law applicable to the entirety
of the defendant's alleged Internet infringement is the law of that
third country.
3. Notwithstanding ## 1 and 2, if the infringing communication was
intentionally directed to a multiplicity of countries, in such a way
that the country of initiation lacks a significant relationship to
the dispute, but no single third country can be shown to be the
principal target, or to have the most significant relationship to
the dispute, then the laws of each country to which the commu-
175. These considerations are adapted from Jane C. Ginsburg, Private International Law
Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights Transmitted Through Digital
Networks (2000 Update), WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/2 (Dec. 18, 2001).
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nication was intentionally directed are applicable to that portion
of the infringement occurring within each territory.
4. In fashioning remedies, the court may take into account the ex-
tent to which, for particular countries in which acts alleged to be
infringements occurred, the domestic law is substantially either
more or less protective than the copyright or related rights law
chosen in accordance with ## 1-2.
A further choice of law problem may arise with respect to sup-
plemental claims, including claims about subject matter not within
TRIPs. The State with the most significant relationship to those
claims will usually be the State(s) whose law(s) govern the main ac-
tion. This Convention does not attempt to propose choice of law
rules for supplemental claims when the State with the most significant
relationship is not the same as the State whose law governs the rest of
the dispute, but failure to apply a law having some significant rela-
tionship to those claims could be a ground for nonrecognition or en-
forcement of so much of the judgment as concerns those claims, even
if the law applied to the infringement claims was not arbitrarily cho-
sen.
Art. 26: Documents to be Produced
This provision was taken from art. 29 of the 1999 Hague Draft,
see Nygh & Pocar Report.176
Art. 27: Procedure
This provision was taken from art. 30 of the 1999 Hague Draft,
see Nygh & Pocar Report.177 The revision of the Hague Draft sug-
gests imposing on the State of enforcement an obligation to provide
an appeal of the enforcement decision. A similar approach is under
consideration for this Convention, on the theory that there is no
court, like the US Supreme Court or the European Court of Justice
where decisions under this Convention are otherwise reviewable.
Art. 28: Costs of Proceedings
This provision was taken from art. 31 of the 1999 Hague Draft,
see Nygh & Pocar Report.178
Art. 29: Legal Aid
This provision was taken from art. 32 of the 1999 Hague Draft,
see Nygh & Pocar Report.79
176. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 110-11.
177. Id. at 111.
178. Id. at 112.
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Remedies: Arts 30-31
Reconciling remedies affords one way to address disparities be-
tween different member States' substantive norms. This Convention
attempts to achieve that goal both through its provisions on damages,
and its provisions on injunctive relief. In general, this proposal en-
deavors to limit the circumstances under which the enforcement court
will be obliged to enter a remedy whose scope considerably exceeds
the remedies that court would impose in a domestic infringement
case. At the same time, however, it is important to acknowledge that
judgments entered pursuant to another jurisdiction's appropriately
chosen law incorporate the remedies envisioned by that law.180 Thus,
assuming the rendering court's judgment is not to be denied enforce-
ment on the ground that the rendering court effected an unreason-
able choice of law (Art. 25.(h)), the enforcement court should
normally enter the remedy devised by the rendering court. Several of
the provisions of Arts. 30 and 31 recognize and seek to alleviate the
tension between the objective of giving effect to the rendering court's
judgment and remaining reasonably consistent with the remedial
norms of the enforcement jurisdiction.
Art. 30: Damages
Art. 30.1 provides that the rendering court need not award
noncompensatory damages in an amount greater than that which the
rendering court would have awarded under domestic law; indeed, if
domestic law allows for compensatory damages only, then the ren-
dering court need not enter noncompensatory damages at all. This
provision thus is consistent with the goal of accommodating remedial
disparities between member States. At the same time, however, it
includes a feature that distinguishes this provision from the 1999
Hague Draft on which it was based: compensatory relief that in the
US is called "statutory damages," that is, damages that are intended
to compensate the plaintiff but without requiring proof of actual
damages. These are not considered exemplary or punitive damages,
as they are designed to replace income or opportunities lost to in-
fringement. The rendering court typically has considerable discretion
to set the award, although the statute may impose a floor and a ceil-
ing. Those States that award statutory damages vest judges with this
discretion because they recognize that proving the amount of lost
179. Id. There is, however, a suggestion in the revised draft that it be removed.
180. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.2 (stating that substantive infringement
standards and remedies are subject to the same law).
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sales can be particularly difficult if the defendant has failed (deliber-
ately or otherwise) to keep reliable business records. An enforce-
ment court does not have discretion to decline to enforce an award of
statutory damages.
Under Art. 30.2, the enforcement court may, within limits, re-
duce the amount of damages that must be paid. Subsection 30.2(a)
envisions the possibility of reducing a "grossly excessive" award, but
only if the judgment creditor has an opportunity to be heard. This
subsection contemplates that the award may be considered "grossly
excessive" under the law of the rendering jurisdiction as well. Sub-
section 30.2(b) limits the enforcement court's damage-reduction
authority by imposing two floors: that of the enforcement jurisdiction,
and that of the rendering jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if both ju-
risdictions calculate damages based on lost sales, but the enforcement
jurisdiction deducts overhead from the lost sales figure, while the
rendering jurisdiction does not, the enforcement jurisdiction must
enter the award based on the rendering jurisdiction's calculation.
Art. 31: Injunctions
This article allows the enforcement court to decline to enter in-
junctive relief under certain well-recognized circumstances, such as
conflict with fundamental public policies, so long as "damages would
afford an effective remedy" for the enforcement court's territory.
While injunctions typically afford the most basic relief in intellectual
property cases, courts, particularly in the US, have recognized cir-
cumstances in which the public interest may be better served by per-
mitting dissemination of the infringing work, while requiring payment
to the rightholder.18i
Because tensions between injunctive relief and domestic substan-
tive or remedial norms may be present, yet may not, in a given case,
be so pronounced as to call into play Art. 31.1's public policy excep-
tions, Art 31.2 refers to the international intellectual property mini-
mum standards set forth in the TRIPs Agreement as an additional
guide to a rendering court's determination to enter an injunction
which would not have been imposed in a purely domestic dispute.
Art. 31.2 allows, but does not oblige, the rendering court to decline to
impose injunctive relief in circumstances in which local norms do not
permit, and the TRIPs minima do not require, this remedy. In that
181. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001).
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event, however, the enforcement court must afford compensatory
relief.
Art. 32: Severability
This provision was taken from art. 34 of the 1999 Hague Draft,
see Nygh & Pocar Report.18 2
Art. 33: Authentic Instruments
This provision was taken from art. 35 of the 1999 Hague Draft,
see Nygh & Pocar Report.183
Art. 34: Settlements
This provision was taken from art. 36 of the 1999 Hague Draft,
see Nygh & Pocar Report.184
Addendum to Commentary on Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and
Judgments in Intellectual Property Cases
To appreciate how the draft Convention's proposals would work
in practice, it may be useful to apply them to a hypothetical multi-
territorial copyright dispute, based on an actual case recently filed in
the Central District of California, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.185 In Grokster, a Dutch enterprise, Consumer Em-
powerment ("CE"), produced, licensed, and distributed the
"FastTrack" file sharing software, as part of an enterprise allegedly
destined to become the "next Napster." CE operates the KaZaA
website, located in the Netherlands. It has licensed the FastTrack
program to MusicCity, whose website is located in the US, and to
Grokster, whose website is located in Nevis, a thirty-six-square-mile
island in the West Indies. The three websites carry advertising. They
also make the FastTrack program available to subscribers so that sub-
182. Nygh & Pocar Report, supra note 12, at 116.
183. Id. at 116-17.
184. Id. at 117-18.
185. No. 01-08541(SVW) (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2, 2001, Mot. to Dismiss denied Mar.
4, 2002). KaZaA B.V., one of the defendants in the Grokster case, is also involved in a similar
lawsuit in the Netherlands, where an appellate court recently overturned the trial court and
ruled that KaZaA was not liable for infringement because it was not responsible for the illegal
acts of third parties using its software. See John Borland, Ruling Bolsters File-Traders'
Prospects, CNET News.Com, Mar. 28, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-870396.html
(reporting on appellate decision); see also Andrea L. Foster, Dutch Court Orders Halt to
Swapping of Copyright-Protected Files on KaZaA, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Nov. 30, 2001,
available at http://chronicle.com/free/2001/11/2001113001t.htm (reporting on trial court ruling).
An unofficial translation of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals decision is available at
http://www.steptoe.comlwebdoc.nsf/Files/196e/$file/196e.pdf (last visited June 17, 2002).
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scribers can exchange files of all kinds, not simply MP3 audio files,
the kind of files at issue in Napster.
Unlike Napster, whose website carried a centralized directory of
titles currently available from all Napster users currently online, the
MusicCity, KaZaA, and Grokster websites do not centralize the in-
formation that permits users to locate and copy available files.
Rather, this information is distributed across "super nodes," comput-
ers participating in the MusicCity, KaZaA, and Grokster networks,
whose speed and storage capacity make them desirable hosts of the
directory information. Owners and operators of "super node" com-
puters do not necessarily know that their computers are being used
for this purpose. Subscribers to any one of the MusicCity, KaZaA, or
Grokster services can access files belonging to subscribers to any of
the other services, as well as to the same service. Although the three
services operate websites that reside on servers in particular territo-
ries, the services appear to accept subscribers from any location.
Thus, a US user might subscribe to the Dutch KaZaA service, and
through that service acquire access to not only files residing on com-
puters belonging to subscribers to the KaZaA service, but also to
those belonging to subscribers to the US MusicCity service and to the
Nevis Grokster service. In order to acquire those files, the sub-
scriber's information location inquiry may pass through computers
located throughout the world, whose owners or operators may sub-
scribe to any one of the three services.
The lawsuit asserts the liability for contributory copyright in-
fringement by the three services, as well as their vicarious liability for
subscribers' infringements. The US, the Netherlands, and Nevis are
all members of the WTO. Assume they have joined this Convention.
Applying the criteria of this draft Convention, all three services are
amenable to jurisdiction in the US. Moreover, the US is the only fo-
rum in which all territorial claims against all three defendants could
be asserted.
MusicCity is subject to a US court's jurisdiction on the basis of
Art. 3, as the US is that defendant's residence. The court's jurisdic-
tion would be general, entitling the court to hear infringement claims
arising both within and without the territorial US. Grokster is ame-
nable to jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 6.2, intentionally directing
the communication to the US. The siting of Grokster in tiny Nevis
appears pretextual, a resort to a "copyright haven" from which to
target subscribers in other countries, particularly the US, as the US is
[Vol. 77:1065
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likely to afford the largest market for Grokster's services. Under Art.
6.2, when the basis of jurisdiction is targeting, and the plaintiff's resi-
dence is the forum, the forum is competent to hear not only claims
arising in the forum's territory, but worldwide. CE would be amena-
ble to suit in the US on the basis of Art. 6.2 with respect to its activi-
ties worldwide, if CE is found to be targeting. But CE may plausibly
claim a substantial home audience in the Netherlands or the Euro-
pean Community, to which its services are at least as "intentionally
directed," if not more so. Even if it is not targeting the US, however,
CE would remain subject to jurisdiction on the basis of Art. 6.3, be-
cause the infringements are foreseeable in the US, and CE has taken
no steps to exclude US subscribers. In this case, the US forum would
not, however, have jurisdiction over CE with respect to acts occurring
outside the US.
Nonetheless, Art. 10 might enable the US court to broaden the
territorial scope of its jurisdiction over CE. When one of multiple
defendants is habitually resident in the forum, Art. 10 permits pro-
ceeding against nonresident defendants if "the claims against the de-
fendant habitually resident in that State and the other defendants are
so closely connected that they should be adjudicated together to
avoid a risk of inconsistent judgments," and "as between the States in
which the other defendants are habitually resident, and the forum,
the forum is the most closely related to the entire dispute, and there is
no other forum in which the entire dispute could be adjudicated." As
the ensuing discussion will show, there is no other forum in which the
entire dispute can be adjudicated. Would inconsistent judgments
result were the US court to adjudicate all claims except those involv-
ing CE's conduct outside the US, and another court to adjudicate
those claims? If the other court, for example, a Dutch court, re-
frained from adjudicating the US claims, the judgments might at first
appear to pose no risk of inconsistency. But the judgments might
nonetheless conflict if the US court enjoined CE's transmissions to
US subscribers or availment of US super nodes, but the Dutch court
ruled CE's Netherlands-based conduct appropriate. In that instance,
the implementation of the US court's remedy in Holland might be
prejudiced, if not blocked. It would be preferable to work through
the territorial implications of the decision in a single action, rather
than in the piecemeal manner that fragmentation between US and
Dutch fora would produce.
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Thus, under this analysis, all three defendants can be sued in the
US with respect to the full territorial extent of the copyright owners'
claims, at least if the two foreign defendants are found to have "inten-
tionally directed" their activities toward the US. Moreover, no other
court would be competent to adjudicate this range of claims; there
would be no reason to consolidate elsewhere, pursuant to Art. 13, nor
for the US court to decline jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 14. The
Netherlands and Nevis courts would have jurisdiction over at least
part of the action, but not over all of it. The US and Nevis services
would be amenable to suit in the Netherlands, because subscriptions
to their services are available to Dutch users. Moreover, even Dutch
users of the KaZaA service obtain the use and benefits of connections
to the files of MusicCity and Grokster subscribers, thanks to the net-
work of super nodes put in place by the common FastTrack software.
Thus, one can infer that some allegedly infringing activity is occurring
in the Netherlands, that this activity is foreseeable, and that neither
MusicCity nor Grokster have endeavored to keep out Dutch users.
The same analysis may be made with respect to CE's and MusicCity's
amenability to suit in Nevis. This would make the nonresident serv-
ices subject to suit in the Netherlands and Nevis, on the basis of Art.
6.3. But this article limits the territorial competence of the forum to
infringing acts occurring or impacting in the forum. Thus, unless
there is some basis for broader judicial competence, for example, un-
der Art. 10, neither a Netherlands nor a Nevis court could hear the
full territorial extent of the claim. As plaintiffs reside in neither fo-
rum, that basis for extension of competence under Art. 6.2 is lacking.
Moreover, under Art. 6.2, the size and population of Nevis make it
unlikely for the intentional direction of infringing files. The Nether-
lands is a more significant market, but any contention that it is the
economic center of gravity for the activities of the Nevis and US
plaintiffs seems unpersuasive. See Art. 14.3(b).
With respect to choice of law, under the criteria suggested in the
commentary to Art. 25(h), the laws of each of the defendant's princi-
pal places of business (US, NL, Nevis) could reasonably apply to de-
termine each defendant's liability.186 But Art. 25(h) also recognizes
186. Because this hypothetical concerns a claim alleging secondary liability, an initial
question might be whether the forum should take account of the law(s) applicable to the
primary infringements, or merely of the law(s) applicable to the services that facilitate or benefit
from those infringements. Arguably, there can be no secondary liability unless the direct actors
have themselves committed wrongful acts. As the lawfulness of their acts would be determined
according to the laws of the countries in which they acted, the laws applicable to the services
who facilitate or benefit from their acts should be the same. Putting aside the complicating
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that another country's law may have a more significant relationship to
the litigation, for example, when another country "is shown to have
been the principal target of the infringing communication." In that
event, "the law applicable to the entirety of the defendant's alleged
Internet infringement is the law of that third country." In the Grok-
ster hypothetical, this would mean that US law could apply to the en-
tirety of the claim against Grokster.
By contrast, with respect to the claim against CE, if the court's
competence is limited to claims alleging infringement in the US, US
law would certainly apply. If instead, the US court has jurisdiction
over the full territorial scope of the claim under Art. 6.2 or Art. 10,
US law would not appropriately apply to the entirety of the claim, as
US subscribers, while certainly a target of CE's activities, may not
constitute the "principal target." But given the intentional direction
of CE's services to subscribers in other countries, if CE's extraterrito-
rial activities outweigh its domestic Dutch market, it would not be
unreasonable under Art. 25 to apply the laws of the various countries
in which CE has subscribers. See criterion #3.
Finally, with respect to all the defendants, even if the court
chooses a single national law to apply to each defendant's activities
(US law with respect to MusicCity and Grokster; Dutch law with re-
spect to CE), criterion #4 allows the court, in fashioning remedies, to
"take into account the extent to which, for particular countries in
which acts alleged to be infringements occurred, the domestic law is
substantially either more or less protective" than the otherwise appli-
cable law. This could affect the court's calculation of damages, or the
scope of the injunction it issues.
factor of secondary liability, under the criteria suggested in the commentary to Art. 25(h), a
starting point is likely to be the laws of the services' residences. Under criterion 1(a), "If the
allegedly infringing content is found on a website, the [applicable law is the] law of the country
in which the operator of the website has its residence or principal place of business." Criterion
1(b) provides: "If the allegedly infringing content is not found on a website, such as through file
sharing, the [applicable law is the] law of the country of the residence or principal place of
business of the person or entity that initiated the communication." Although the Grokster
litigation concerns file sharing, one might contend that the entities that initiated the
communications are those that distributed the file sharing software and control the network
through which the file searches are made.
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